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Broken Records: Reconceptualizing 
Rational Basis Review to Address 
“Alternative Facts” in the Legislative 
Process 
Joseph Landau* 
In 2016, North Carolina passed “HB2,” also known as the “bathroom 
ban”—a law prohibiting transgender individuals from accessing public 
restrooms corresponding to their gender identity—based on the unfounded fear 
that cisgender men posing as transgender women would assault women and 
girls in bathrooms. Around the same time, Alabama enacted a punishing 
immigration law in which sponsors distorted statistics regarding the 
undocumented population by using the terms “Latino/Hispanic” and “illegal 
immigrant” interchangeably. These laws are reflective of a larger pattern. In 
our increasingly polarized political climate, policymakers are affirmatively 
distorting legislative records and promoting dubious justifications for their 
policy goals—that is, they are legislating on the basis of “alternative facts”—in 
ways that pose unique harms for those excluded from the political process. 
Some scholars have responded to the phenomenon of alternative facts 
in the legislative process by arguing for an enhanced analysis of legislative 
motivation. Others argue for a more general reexamination of the relationship 
between courts and legislative fact. This Article argues instead for a middle-
ground approach whereby courts perform a threshold legal analysis to 
determine whether a given piece of legislation was enacted over a “broken 
legislative record.” Should a litigant persuade the court that a challenged act is 
predicated on a distorted factual foundation, such that no rational legislator 
could have supported its enactment, the burden would shift to the government 
to demonstrate that its ends are grounded in some objective measure of basic 
truth or rationality. If the government cannot do so, the law should fail. 
 
 * Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. I am grateful to Daniel Abowd, Edgar Aliferov, 
Jessica Barnhardt, Pam Bookman, Jim Brudney, Ben Clinger, Courtney Cox, Nestor Davidson, 
Joshua Deull, Mitchell Friedman, Ben Klein, Rebecca Kysar, Ethan Leib, Zachary Leibowitz, 
Rachel Manning, Emily Morrow, Joshua Phang, Sepehr Shahshahani, Johnny Shaw, Juliette 
Todd, Shannon Walker, and Tim Whitteaker for their comments and suggestions. 
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Broken records review looks at facts relied upon (in all likelihood) in 
bad faith; it is not concerned with bad faith itself. This leads to a number of 
descriptive and normative implications. First, legislative rationales falling 
outside of the factual realm, including purely moral justifications, would not be 
reachable by a broken records challenge. Moreover, while the “bite” of broken 
records scrutiny may lead some to raise the specter of Lochnerian judicial 
overreach, the inquiry is far more limited and would not lead to the invalidation 
of appropriate legislative policy choices. Indeed, the breadth of a broken records 
challenge would be limited to a review of whatever factual bases were actually 
employed to support a given piece of legislation.  
One appeal of broken records review is that it echoes a customary 
judicial determination grounded in fact: indeed, the reasonable-legislator 
standard bears a useful resemblance to the reasonable-juror standard routinely 
considered during summary judgment. And the roadmap for litigants to follow 
is clearer than what other scholars propose: groups seeking to invoke the 
Supreme Court’s countermajoritarian prerogative can focus on more objective 
criteria—either gross misrepresentations of the number of credible examples of 
the evil allegedly targeted or other evidence counter to the legislative narrative—
instead of pushing for de novo review of legislative factfinding or divining the 
subjective impulses of legislatures to show animus. Far from an open-ended 
invitation for courts to undertake legislative factfinding, the process proposed 
by this Article would simply empower judges to scrutinize invidious legislation 
more carefully by addressing the structural defect of broken legislative records. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, North Carolina passed “HB2,” also known as the 
“bathroom ban”—a law prohibiting transgender individuals from 
accessing public restrooms corresponding to their gender identity—
based on the unfounded fear that cisgender men posing as transgender 
women would attack women and girls in bathrooms.1 Around the same 
 
 1. See Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, N.C. GEN STAT. § 143-760 (2016) (repealed 
2017). The legislation was a response to the City of Charlotte’s passage of an amendment to its 
nondiscrimination law that added protection for LGBT people. See Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 
7056 (Feb. 22, 2016). Under the threat of litigation and pressure from major financial and sporting 
institutions, the legislature agreed to a partial repeal. See Emery P. Dalesio & Jonathan Drew, AP 
Exclusive: Price Tag of North Carolina’s LGBT Law: $3.76B, AP NEWS (Mar. 27, 2017), 
https://www.apnews.com/fa4528580f3e4a01bb68bcb272f1f0f8 [https://perma.cc/EH9U-XXVR] 
(“[T]he law limiting LGBT protections will cost the state more than $3.76 billion in lost business 
over a dozen years . . . .”); Barb Darrow, Bank of America Joins Fight Against North Carolina 
Bathroom Law, FORTUNE (Mar. 30, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/03/30/boa-pushes-slams-north-
carolina-bathroom-law/ [https://perma.cc/PNP6-TRGC]; David Goldman, North Carolina Loses 
400 Jobs as PayPal Pulls Facility, CNN (Apr. 5, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/04/05/ 
technology/paypal-north-carolina-lgbt/index.html [https:// perma.cc/Y5SJ-P225] (“PayPal has 
canceled its plans to open a new global operation center in Charlotte, following passage of a North 
Carolina law that prevents cities from creating non-discrimination policies based on gender 
identity.”); German Lopez, HB2, North Carolina’s Sweeping Anti-LGBTQ Law, Explained, VOX 
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time, when Alabama passed a law purporting to deny immigrants 
educational and other benefits they were lawfully entitled to receive,2 a 
court struck down the law, noting that the state legislature, by 
construing data about the Hispanic population as tantamount to 
evidence about the undocumented population, manufactured the very 
problem it wished to solve.3 These laws illustrate how facts central to 
constitutional decisionmaking generate competing narratives—deeply 
held, but reflecting divergent versions of reality4—and also how 
policymakers today often legitimate the justification for their preferred 
laws by twisting facts, peddling myths, trafficking in sheer speculation, 
and promoting conspiracy theories. 
Though the reliance on such false bases for government actions 
is not a new phenomenon, its growing prevalence presents a number of 
especially stark consequences for groups that are generally excluded 
from, or disfavored by, the political process5—especially those who fall 
outside the protection of traditional heightened scrutiny categories.6 As 
 
(Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.vox.com/2016/2/23/11100552/charlotte-north-carolina-lgbtq-pat-
mccrory [https://perma.cc/C58U-QHTU]. 
 2. Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Laws 888 
(codified as amended at ALA. CODE §§ 31-13-1 to 31-13-30, 32-6-9 (2020)) (referred to as H.B. 56); 
see Court Cites Discriminatory Intent Behind Alabama’s Anti-immigrant Law, S. POVERTY L. CTR. 
(Dec. 14, 2011), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2011/12/14/court-cites-discriminatory-intent-
behind-alabamas-anti-immigrant-law [https://perma.cc/U8M5-VDYS] (discussing a federal judge’s 
“blistering court ruling” criticizing H.B. 56). 
 3. See infra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing Central Alabama Fair Housing 
Center. v. Magee, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1192 (M.D. Ala. 2011), vacated sub nom. Cent. Ala. Fair 
Hous. Ctr. v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 11-16114-CC, 2013 WL 2372302 (11th Cir. May 
17, 2013)).  
 4. Allison Orr Larsen, Constitutional Law in an Age of Alternative Facts, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
175, 179 (2018). 
 5. One infamous example is Korematsu v. United States, in which a presidential executive 
order authorized the military to issue exclusion orders during World War II against persons of 
Japanese ancestry residing in certain areas on the West Coast. 323 U.S. 214, 215–17 (1944), 
abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). Korematsu’s appeal of his conviction for 
defying the order was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Id. at 223–24. Today, the military’s 
justifications for targeting Japanese persons are recognized as having reflected “race prejudice 
[and] war hysteria” rather than fact. 1 COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION & INTERNMENT OF 
CITIZENS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 18 (1982), https://www.archives.gov/files/research/japanese-
americans/justice-denied/summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/QCT6-XNV9]; see also Korematsu, 323 
U.S. 214 at 235–36 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (describing the military’s justifications as based on 
“erroneous assumption[s] of racial guilt rather than bona fide military necessity” and utterly 
lacking in “reliable evidence”). 
 6. Transgender individuals and undocumented foreign nationals are not formally protected 
classes, nor are many of the other legislatively targeted groups discussed throughout this Article. 
See Robert I. Correales, Workers’ Compensation and Vocational Rehabilitation Benefits for 
Undocumented Workers: Reconciling the Purported Conflicts Between State Law, Federal 
Immigration Law, and Equal Protection to Prevent the Creation of a Disposable Workforce, 81 
DENV. U. L. REV. 347, 391 (2003) (noting that while there have been isolated instances in which 
the Court has intervened to protect undocumented immigrants, generally “the Court has refused 
to extend [this seemingly heightened scrutiny] to other situations involving rather compelling 
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a result, absent visible plus factors such as explicit animus (and 
sometimes even in the face of such animus), state action discriminating 
against these populations is not traditionally required to clear a higher 
scrutiny bar when challenged in court. This gap in equal protection 
coverage renders those groups especially vulnerable to the prejudicial 
aims of state legislatures, particularly when the flames of that prejudice 
are fanned by falsehoods. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s constitutional doctrines, as they 
have evolved, are strikingly ill-suited to address falsehoods and are 
mostly bereft of any explicit command for factual analysis.7 Given the 
perverse effects of polarization and alternative facts on individual 
rights—with the attendant rejection of technical, scientific, evidence-
based judgment and abandonment of time-tested and ordinary 
legislative procedure8—scholars have begun to contemplate the role of 
courts in evaluating legislative factfinding, particularly (though not 
exclusively) in cases involving the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution. Some argue for more scrutiny of actual legislative purpose 
across the board,9 while others propose more nuanced paradigms of 
judicial review expanding courts’ capacity to reexamine, and possibly 
override, the legislative factfinding process.10  
 
facts”); see also Kevin M. Barry et al., A Bare Desire to Harm: Transgender People and the Equal 
Protection Clause, 57 B.C. L. REV. 507, 509 (2016) (“[I]n the context of a facially discriminatory 
federal law, no court or agency has analyzed whether transgender people are a ‘suspect’ or ‘quasi-
suspect’ class . . . [and] the constitutional rights of transgender people remain uncertain.”). Since 
that article was published, some recent lower-court rulings have moved towards heightened 
scrutiny in cases involving transgender rights. See, e.g., Karnoski v. Trump, 926 F.3d 1180, 1201 
(9th Cir. 2019) (“We conclude that the 2018 Policy [banning openly transgender individuals from 
serving in the military] on its face treats transgender persons differently than other persons, and 
consequently something more than rational basis but less than strict scrutiny applies.”). 
 7. See infra Section I.B. 
 8. For a detailed discussion of how deviations from ordinary political-branch processes can 
help surface forms of improper intent that are otherwise hard for courts to recognize, see Joseph 
Landau, Process Scrutiny: Motivational Inquiry and Constitutional Rights, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 
2147 (2019). 
 9. See Jeffrey D. Jackson, Classical Rational Basis and the Right to Be Free of Arbitrary 
Legislation, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 511–12 (2016) (proposing that the rational basis test 
not require that “a legislature could have thought the law to be rationally related” to the 
government’s stated goal but rather that the law “actually be rationally related” to its purpose); 
Clark Neily, Litigation Without Adjudication: Why the Modern Rational Basis Test Is 
Unconstitutional, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 537, 550 (2016) (arguing that the rational basis test 
is an insufficient judicial check on governmental action). 
 10. See William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding in Rights-Enforcing and 
Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 882–83 (2013) (arguing for a “more nuanced 
examination” of the “appropriate degree of judicial deference due to congressional fact-findings 
that support legislation affecting individual rights”); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial 
Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding, 84 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (2009) (arguing that “courts should 
independently review the factual foundation of all legislation that curtails important individual 
rights protected by the federal Constitution”); Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the 
Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1171–72 (2001) (calling on 
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Given the shortcomings of both proposals, this Article proposes 
a middle-ground approach whereby courts address head-on a 
legislature’s trafficking in inaccuracies, myths, or conspiracy theories 
in its assertions supporting a given law. Under this approach, the 
government’s subjective intent is immaterial. Broken records analysis 
does not burden trial courts with an intent-driven inquiry into why a 
particular group has been targeted—an inquiry that often proves 
impossible to carry out with certainty.11 Rather, broken records 
analysis offers courts a framework they are quite capable of following: 
an evaluation of the evidentiary foundation within a legislature’s stated 
factual rationales for targeting that group.12 Challengers to government 
actions would have an opportunity to demonstrate that a given piece of 
legislation is predicated on a false factual foundation and that no 
rational legislator could have supported its enactment.  
Once a successful prima facie broken records claim is made, the 
burden would shift to the government to demonstrate that the problem 
it seeks to address is real—that its ends are grounded in some objective 
measure of basic truth or rationality. If the government cannot do so, 
the law should fail. If, however, the challenger cannot satisfy its burden, 
the court would proceed to apply the doctrine as it currently stands—
rational basis would invite deference,13 whereas heightened scrutiny 
would call for a closer analysis of the government’s stated objective and 
its chosen means.14  
 
the Supreme Court “to check [congressional interest in factfinding] when the risk of special-
interest capture seems especially significant”); Larsen, supra note 4, at 182 (suggesting “re-
focusing the standards of review in constitutional litigation so that courts are tasked with 
evaluating the process used to generate the factual claims presented”). 
 11. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. 
L. REV. 523, 553–54 (2016) (noting that legislative intent is a “protean concept,” inevitably colored 
by the particular fact pattern it inhabits); id. at 527–28 (arguing that the Supreme Court has 
adopted “varied approaches to the identification of legislative intent,” some of which “manifest 
ambiguity,” in part because “multimember legislatures typically have no unitary, collective 
intentions in the psychological sense”); see also Aziz Z. Huq, What Is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 
CORNELL L. REV. 1211, 1215 (2018) (observing that “the federal judiciary has not homed in upon a 
single definition of discriminatory intent” or “a consistent approach to the evidentiary tools 
through which discriminatory intent is substantiated”). 
 12. See infra Section III.C (distinguishing the kind of “fact”-supported state acts reachable 
by broken records review from the purely values-driven acts that fall outside of broken records 
review’s purview). 
 13. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2402 (2018) (defining the rational basis inquiry as 
“whether the . . . policy is plausibly related to the Government’s stated objective”); City of New 
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (requiring only that “the classification challenged be 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest”); Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 
106, 110 (1949) (asking that a classification have only a “relation to the purpose for which it is 
made”). 
 14. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“[Racial] classifications are 
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests.”); 
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996) (requiring an “exceedingly persuasive” 
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Broken records review concerns the process by which 
legislatures form the purpose and factual basis for legislation, an 
inquiry that avoids wholly refashioning the judicial power and the 
relationship among the coordinate branches.15 It presents a practical 
approach that is aligned with contemporary practices and doctrine—
particularly by analogy to summary judgment’s threshold evidentiary 
requirement.16 Unlike a constitutional theory that requires a court to 
determine ex ante whether a particular group has suffered prejudice at 
the hand of a legislative majority—a subjective determination on which 
conservative and liberal justices largely disagree—an evidence-based, 
broken-record-style approach couched in more objective standards 
likely has broader appeal, while still coming to the aid of many (though 
not all) marginalized groups affected by the spread of alternative facts.  
Moreover, under broken records review, the roadmap for 
litigants to follow is clearer: groups seeking to invoke the Court’s 
countermajoritarian prerogative can focus on more objective criteria—
either a shortage of government evidence or evidence counter to the 
legislative narrative—instead of relying on the subjective 
interpretation of facts tending to show animus or trying to persuade 
federal courts, as some scholars have argued, to exercise plenary review 
of the legislative factfinding process. And although the “bite” of such 
rational basis scrutiny may lead some to raise the specter of Lochnerian 
judicial overreach, the limited inquiry proposed by this Article should 
not lead to the invalidation of most legislative policy choices. To be 
clear, the breadth of such a claim would be limited to the factual bases 
employed to support the legislation; indeed, legislative rationales 
falling outside of the factual realm, including purely moral 
justifications, would not be reachable by a broken records challenge. 
The process proposed by this Article would simply empower judges to 
invalidate invidious legislation by using rational basis review to 
address the structural defect of broken legislative records. 
Following this Introduction, Part I explores a number of areas 
where alternative facts have recently loomed large, and where 
legislative trafficking in myth, hyperbole, or conspiracy theory has 
presented a puzzle and a doctrinal problem for courts. Part II frames 
how scholars have responded to the problem of alternative facts, as well 
 
justification for classifications on the basis of sex (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 
U.S. 718, 724 (1982))); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993) (“This burden [of justifying 
a restriction on commercial speech] is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a 
governmental body . . . must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction 
will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”). 
15.  See infra Section II.B. 
16.  See infra Section III.B.  
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as the benefits and drawbacks of those approaches. Part III introduces 
the theory of broken records review as a superior mechanism to address 
the problem, noting its core features and fit with other commonly 
accepted procedural devices—summary judgment in particular. Part IV 
explores how leading constitutional frameworks such as the Court’s 
discriminatory intent and animus doctrines address the problem of 
broken legislative records only tangentially and may actually lead 
courts astray from identifying the constitutional import of alternative 
facts. Part V considers the normative implications of broken records 
review, demonstrating why, despite the charge of returning to the 
discredited days of Lochner, the theory provides a workable and 
appropriately revived form of rational basis review. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF ALTERNATIVE FACTS IN LAWMAKING 
Legislation predicated on falsehoods or mistaken facts is not a 
new phenomenon, but it has taken on greater salience in light of 
heightened polarization and advances in forms of communication that 
allow for faster dissemination of false facts.17 This problem has reached 
a new order of magnitude of late in many different areas of lawmaking. 
Not only have some policymakers dispensed with any effort to ground 
law in objective facts or data, but when the actual science is misaligned 
with a preferred policy goal, or when the facts threaten the cultural 
values of a constituency, policymakers simply resort to presenting 
“alternative” ones.18 Opponents of such myth-based legislation, 
particularly when it imperils the rights of  politically vulnerable groups, 
have occasionally been successful waging boycotts in response19 or 
using litigation to combat these laws. Courts have begun to take note of 
situations in which such sheer inaccuracies in the legislative process 
undermine the soundness of a given piece of legislation—for example, 
where legislatures rely on the testimony of unqualified “experts” or 
(more commonly) propound incorrect, misleading, or inapplicable 
information in favor of a given bill.20 But they have been reticent to go 
too far in this direction, given the limitations of current doctrinal 
frameworks that leave little or no room to consider their constitutional 
salience.  
 
 17. See, e.g., Larsen, supra note 4, at 177, 180–81 (arguing that “technological speed, infinite 
access to information, a balkanized press, and a diluted notion of expertise” have facilitated a “toxic 
political dialogue of rogue facts” imperiling both legislative processes and a constitutional 
jurisprudence “increasingly dependent on factual claims”). 
 18. Id. at 190–91.  
 19. See infra Section I.A.1. 
 20. See infra Sections I.A.2–3 & Part IV. 
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A. “Public Safety” and Alternative Facts 
1. Transgender Rights and Public Safety 
Shortly after the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision recognizing the 
right of same-sex couples to marry, transgender rights emerged as a 
major flashpoint within a number of states where LGBT interests 
remain poorly represented, with legislatures stoking fears about 
purported threats that transgender people pose to public safety. One 
well-known example concerns North Carolina’s “HB2,” a law 
prohibiting transgender individuals statewide from accessing public 
restrooms corresponding to their gender identity.21 The law was passed 
in swift reaction to the City of Charlotte’s passage of an LGBT 
nondiscrimination ordinance, and it ignited a nationwide firestorm 
about LGBT rights.22 But HB2 also typified how legislators can deploy 
alternative facts to run roughshod over the rights of marginalized 
groups. To pass HB2, the state general assembly hastily threw together 
a single twelve-hour “special session”23 to whirl through the entire 
legislative cycle (from introduction and passage in the general 
assembly, to passage in the state senate, to enactment into law by the 
governor’s signature) for a bill that legislators did not even see before 
its release.24  
Around the time of HB2, nineteen states attempted to pass anti-
LGBT ordinances, of which sixteen specifically targeted trans people.25 
Where the bathroom laws were concerned, politicians often promoted a 
fabrication that nondiscrimination laws increase the risk of assaults 
because of cisgender “men [taking] advantage of the law to enter 
women’s bathrooms to harass and sexually assault women.”26 One such 
advertising campaign depicted “a young girl in a bathroom stall, with a 
 
 21. Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, N.C. GEN STAT. § 143-760 (2016) (repealed 2017). 
 22. Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 7056 (Feb. 22, 2016); see discussion and sources cited supra 
note 1. 
 23. Dave Philipps, North Carolina Bans Local Anti-Discrimination Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/24/us/north-carolina-to-limit-bathroom-use-by-birth-
gender.html [https://perma.cc/WNF6-SPZ8]. 
 24. See id.; see also Lopez, supra note 1 (“HB2 [was] proposed and signed into law within 24 
hours.”). 
 25. See Past LGBT Nondiscrimination and Anti-LGBT Bills Across the Country (2016), 
ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/past-lgbt-nondiscrimination-and-anti-lgbt-bills-across-country 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9A6Q-4PLL]. If including religious exemption 
legislation, that number jumps to thirty-two. See id. 
 26. Lopez, supra note 1; see also Katy Steinmetz, Why LGBT Advocates Say Bathroom 
‘Predators’ Argument Is a Red Herring, TIME (May 2, 2016), http://time.com/4314896/transgender-
bathroom-bill-male-predators-argument/ [https://perma.cc/J7GN-EG6R] (describing the bathroom 
safety argument and the rebuttal). 
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chilling voiceover warning that a man could enter at any time.”27 Some 
of these laws did not succeed: in the case of North Carolina’s HB2, 
PayPal, Bank of America, and the NCAA (among others) cancelled or 
threatened to pull out of business ventures in the state unless the law 
was rescinded. In response to that pushback, the state legislature 
agreed to a partial repeal.28  
2. The So-Called Immigration Threat 
In addition to passing laws affecting LGBT rights, states have 
been unusually busy enacting legislation pertaining to immigration in 
a fashion that further demonstrates the utility of alternative facts to 
lawmakers willing to demonize a politically weak minority. In 2017 
alone, lawmakers in forty-nine states enacted more than two hundred 
such laws.29 Some of the more controversial measures, notably 
provisions purporting to criminalize at the state level violations of 
federal immigration law, as well as efforts to strip benefits from 
recipients of programs such as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(“DACA”),30 appear to place vulnerable communities under significant 
threat.  
 
 27. Sarah Posner, Anti-Trans Bathroom Debate: How a Local Religious-Right Faction 
Launched a National Movement, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 22, 2018, 8:06 PM), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/how-houstons-religious-right-launched-the-anti-lgbtq-
bathroom-movement-w515477 [https://perma.cc/32GA-HMHP]; see also Kathy Miller & Lisa 
Scheps, The Lies Behind Texas Anti-Abortion Laws and “Bathroom Bills,” TRIBTALK (July 20, 
2017), https://www.tribtalk.org/2017/07/20/the-lies-behind-texas-anti-abortion-laws-and-
bathroom-bills/ [https://perma.cc/P6TN-XFYT] (criticizing the “buzzwords” of “privacy,” “safety,” 
and “protecting girls” as “based on lies”). 
 28. See sources cited supra note 1. 
 29. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2017 IMMIGRATION REPORT (2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/2017-immigration-report.aspx [https://perma.cc/6YFP-
WYRN]. 
 30. DACA is an exercise of federal prosecutorial discretion, initiated in 2012, under which 
undocumented immigrants who arrived in the United States prior to the age of sixteen—and who 
meet other defined criteria—may receive deportation relief and work authorization for a renewable 
two-year period. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States 
as Children (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-
discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/VTJ9-JANM]. DACA 
approval plus work authorization qualifies an individual for a Social Security Number, which 
cumulatively should suffice for driver’s license eligibility in every state. Kendra Sena, Driver’s 
Licenses and Undocumented Immigrants, GOV’T L. CTR., ALB. L. SCH. 6, 
https://www.albanylaw.edu/centers/government-law-center/Immigration/explainers/Documents/ 
DriversLicensesExplainer.pdf (last updated Jul. 15, 2019) [https://perma.cc/8AHR-SBBZ]. 
Nonetheless, three states—Arizona, Michigan, and Nebraska—initially refused to issue driver’s 
licenses to DACA recipients. Jonathan Blazer, Nebraska Legislature Overrides Governor’s Veto 
and Gives Dreamers Their License to Drive, ACLU (May 29, 2015, 12:30 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/state-and-local-immigration-laws/nebraska-
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In 2011, Alabama passed the Beason-Hammon Alabama 
Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, one of the most restrictive state 
immigration laws in the country.31 The law targeted undocumented 
foreign nationals in numerous ways, including by prohibiting them 
from receiving any state or local public benefits,32 barring them from 
attending publicly owned colleges or universities,33 and prohibiting 
them from applying for or performing work.34 The law also forbade 
judicial enforcement of certain contracts made with undocumented 
foreign nationals,35 prohibited rental agreements to provide them with 
accommodations,36 and prohibited certain transactions between 
undocumented individuals and state or local government, including the 
provision of a license plate or nondriver identification card.37 In support 
of the law, sponsors presented statistics that conflated race with 
immigration status, resulting in legislation that purported to address 
the issue of undocumented immigration but, owing to its false factual 
foundation, wound up distorting the law’s necessity and underlying 
rationale. The bill’s sponsor made a habit of substantiating his talking 
point that “Alabama has the second-fastest-growing illegal immigrant 
population in the nation” with references to growth in the state’s 
Hispanic population, information that “sa[id] nothing about 
unauthorized immigration whatsoever.”38  
Another member of the state legislature also resorted to 
inaccuracies when attempting to document illegal immigration’s drain 
on state resources, again by focusing on Latino populations that were 
immaterial to the noncitizen or immigrant population.39 Such repeated 
attempts to use “illegal immigrant” interchangeably with “Latino” or 
“Hispanic” undermined confidence that the resulting law was grounded 
in fact; instead, it sounded alarms about the legality and rational basis 
 
legislature-overrides-governors [https://perma.cc/ZLP2-S3YZ]. Nebraska, the final holdout, did not 
relent until 2015. Id. 
 31. Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Laws 888 
(codified as amended at ALA. CODE §§ 31-13-1 to 31-13-30, 32-6-9 (2020)) (referred to as H.B. 56). 
This act has been partially enjoined. United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (2012). 
 32.  § 7(b), 2011 Ala. at 898 (codified at ALA. CODE § 31-13-7(b)). 
 33.  § 8, 2011 Ala. at 901 (codified at ALA. CODE § 31-13-8). 
 34. § 11(a), 2011 Ala. at 905 (codified at ALA. CODE § 31-13-11(a)), enjoined by Alabama, 691 
F.3d 1269. 
 35.  § 27(a), 2011 Ala. at 919 (codified at ALA. CODE § 31-13-26(a)), enjoined by Alabama, 691 
F.3d 1269. 
 36.  § 13(a)(4), 2011 Ala. at 908 (current version at ALA. CODE § 31-13-33), enjoined by 
Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269. 
 37.  § 30(b), 2011 Ala. at 927 (codified as amended at ALA. CODE § 31-13-29(b)). 
 38. Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1192 (M.D. Ala. 2011), vacated 
sub nom. Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 11-16114-CC, 2013 WL 
2372302 (11th Cir. May 17, 2013). 
 39. Id. at 1192–93. 
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of the law, which was eventually set aside by a court willing to 
interrogate the legislation’s manifestly shoddy factual foundation.40  
Other such laws have often been legitimated through the lens of 
public safety. For example, in 2019, when Florida passed a bill 
forbidding sanctuary cities,41 the senator who sponsored the measure 
touted the law’s purpose as “about public safety and making sure we 
remove the criminal element of illegals that are here.”42 Yet recent 
studies have demonstrated that the presence of undocumented 
immigrants is not linked with an increase in violent crime or drug and 
alcohol problems.43 Indeed, the Cato Institute found that criminal 
conviction and arrest rates for undocumented immigrants in Texas 
 
 40. Id. (noting that H.B. 56’s backers “conflated race and immigration status,” thereby 
distorting the growth of the undocumented population in the state); id. at 1193: 
[T]he county population figures [that Representative Kerry] Rich relies on are for 
Hispanics, not non-citizens or illegal immigrants. Moreover, his criticism (that “[t]he 
ones that I have a problem with are the ones that come here and create all kinds of 
social and economic problems”) appears to be aimed at Hispanics in general, not illegal 
immigrants. 
 41. Tim Craig, Florida House Passes Bill that Forbids ‘Sanctuary Cities,’ Would Issue Fines 
for Failing to Help Federal Immigration Authorities, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2019, 1:34 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/florida-house-passes-bill-that-forbids-sanctuary-cities-
would-issue-fines-for-failing-to-help-federal-immigration-authorities/2019/04/24/8c95f1ce-65e5-
11e9-a1b6-b29b90efa879_story.html [https://perma.cc/KKY5-U8QA]. House Bill 527 died in the 
Rules Committee, but a similar bill, Senate Bill 168, passed by both the House and Senate, was 
approved by the Governor on June 14, 2019, and largely took effect on October 1, 2019. Among 
other things, the new law prohibits sanctuary policies, requires state and local government entities 
(including law enforcement agencies) to use best efforts to support enforcement of federal 
immigration law, and under certain circumstances authorizes law enforcement agencies to 
transport individuals unlawfully present in the United States across state lines for transfer to 
federal custody. FLA. STAT. §§ 908.101–908.109 (2019); H.B. 527, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2019). 
A judge from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida blocked the provision 
authorizing participation by state officials in the interstate transport of detainees. Monique O. 
Madan & Daniel Rivero, All Florida Cops and Elected Officials Will Be Forced to Comply with ICE 
as of Tuesday, MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 30, 2019 7:20 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/ 
immigration/article235631727.html [https://perma.cc/S23V-RX9L]. 
 42. Craig, supra note 41. 
 43. Recent research by the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and published in the journal 
Criminology found that the increase in illegal immigration since 1990 did not correspond with an 
increase in violent crime, and another study showed that undocumented youth engage in less crime 
than their documented or U.S.-born counterparts. Michael T. Light & Ty Miller, Does 
Undocumented Immigration Increase Violent Crime?, 56 CRIMINOLOGY 370, 393–96 (2018); John 
Burnett, Illegal Immigration Does Not Increase Violent Crime, 4 Studies Show, NPR (May 2, 2018, 
5:09 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/05/02/607652253/studies-say-illegal-immigration-does-not-
increase-violent-crime [https://perma.cc/ZRM9-6WEF]. Another study jointly conducted by four 
universities and published in the Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice found that immigration 
is consistently linked to decreases in violent and property crime. Robert Adelman et al., Urban 
Crime Rates and the Changing Face of Immigration: Evidence Across Four Decades, 15 J. 
ETHNICITY CRIM. JUST. 52, 70 (2017). 
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were lower than those of native-born Americans for homicide, sexual 
assault, larceny, and other crimes.44  
At the national level, the Trump Administration’s travel ban is 
a paradigmatic example of the same phenomenon, albeit with Muslims 
rather than Latinos as the targeted out-group.45 While President 
Trump grounded the policy in a claimed security need to protect the 
country,46 experts within his own administration opposed the policy on 
national security grounds, finding that it would actually make the 
country less safe.47 Among the many objections voiced across the 
national security establishment was that not a single national of any of 
the eight countries targeted by the travel ban had carried out a deadly 
terrorist attack in the United States in the forty years prior to its 
enactment.48  
3. The Superpredator Myth in Criminal Sentencing 
Another illustration of the influence of spurious facts in U.S. law 
comes from the sentencing context. Congress and state legislatures—
responding to the imagined depredations of a made-up persona, the 
“superpredator”—prescribed a dramatic increase in lengthy and 
punitive sentences for violent crime, a remedy with grave consequences 
 
 44. Alex Nowrasteh, Criminal Immigrants in Texas, CATO INST. 5 (Feb. 26, 2018), 
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/irpb-4-updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/LNX2-
78VD]. 
 45. See Proclamation 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017) (restricting indefinitely the 
entry of certain nationals from Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and 
Yemen). 
 46. See id. (claiming that the travel ban, in keeping with “the policy of the United States to 
protect its citizens from terrorist attacks and other public-safety threats,” would “enhance our 
ability to detect foreign nationals who may commit, aid, or support acts of terrorism, or otherwise 
pose a safety threat, and . . . aid our efforts to prevent such individuals from entering the United 
States”). 
 47. Two unclassified Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) memos undermined the 
President’s claimed security need. According to one memo, because “most foreign-born, U.S.-based 
violent extremists became radicalized many years after entering the United States,” the “increased 
screening and vetting” called for by the executive order was “unlikely to significantly reduce 
terrorism-related activity in the United States.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 
F.3d 554, 575 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting a DHS memo). Another memo found “that citizenship in any 
country is likely an unreliable indicator of whether a particular individual poses a terrorist threat.” 
Id. 
 48. See Brief of Amici Curiae Former National Security Officials in Support of Respondents 
at 18, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965), 2018 WL 1733146, at *18 (“In fact, 
the Proclamation targets eight countries whose nationals have committed no deadly terrorist 
attacks on U.S. soil in the last forty years.”); see also Alex Nowrasteh, President Trump’s New 
Travel Executive Order Has Little National Security Justification, CATO INST. (Sept. 25, 2017, 6:47 
AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/zero-terrorists-eight-countries-new-trump-travel-executive-order 
[https://perma.cc/G3KC-7F9S] (providing statistics demonstrating that “[f]rom 1975 
through . . . 2015, zero Americans have been killed by foreign-born terrorists on U.S. soil who hail 
from any of the eight countries on the new executive order”). 
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for the adolescent and young-adult black men whose stifled political 
voice allowed the myth to flourish in the first place. The term 
“superpredator” was coined by Princeton academic John DiIulio as part 
of a multipronged agenda to convince others that a “generation of 
amoral youthful outlaws [and] . . . a wave of young killers was on the 
horizon.”49 DiIulio preached that youths, particularly those of color50 in 
urban areas, “were so morally corrupt that rehabilitation was 
useless.”51 DiIulio, who did not view these individuals as children but 
instead as “fatherless, Godless, and jobless” superpredators,52 was 
joined by criminologist James Alan Fox, who embraced the 
superpredator myth and warned that “[u]nless we act today, we’re going 
to have a bloodbath when these kids grow up.”53 Although DiIulio and 
Fox’s prediction never came to fruition, the nation took notice—and 
responded. Some politicians exploited these public fears by pledging to 
“get tough” on juvenile criminals.54 Hillary Clinton, referencing 
 
 49. JOHN R. MILLS ET AL., PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT, NO HOPE: RE-EXAMINING LIFETIME 
SENTENCES FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS 10 (2015), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/ 
55bd511ce4b0830374d25948/t/5600cc20e4b0f36b5ccaab8a/1442892832535/JLWOP+2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EWZ6-76U4] [hereinafter PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT]; Joseph E. Kennedy, Juries 
for Juveniles, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 291, 296 n.15 (2013) (“The term ‘superpredator’ was coined by 
John DiIulio, who sounded the alarm about a coming wave of violent dangerous youths growing 
up in moral poverty.”); see also WILLIAM J. BENNETT, JOHN J. DIIULIO JR. & JOHN P. WALTERS, 
BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY . . . AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 
27 (1996) (“America is now home to thickening ranks of juvenile ‘super-predators’—radically 
impulsive, brutally remorseless youngsters, including ever more pre-teenage boys who . . . do not 
fear the stigma of arrest, the pains of imprisonment, or the pangs of conscience.”).  
 50. Scholars have noted how the “superpredator” myth was racially charged, focusing 
specifically on the “dangers” of African-American youth. Sarah French Russell, Jury Sentencing 
and Juveniles: Eighth Amendment Limits and Sixth Amendment Rights, 56 B.C. L. REV. 553, 610 
(2015).  
 51. FAIR PUNISHMENT PROJECT, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE IN PHILADELPHIA: A TIME 
FOR HOPE? 13 (2016), http://fairpunishment.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/FPP_JLWOP_ 
philadelphia_r601.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7GZ-CXB5]. 
 52. John J. DiIulio, Jr., Arresting Ideas, HOOVER INSTITUTION POL’Y REV. (Sept. 1, 1995), 
https://www.hoover.org/research/arresting-ideas [https://perma.cc/UZ4X-9B8G]. 
 53. See Brief of Jeffrey Fagan et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 14, Miller v. 
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Nos. 10-9647, 10-9646), 2012 WL 174240, at *14 (quoting Laurie 
Garrett, Murder by Teens Has Soared Since ’85, N.Y. NEWSDAY (Feb. 18, 1995)) (alteration in 
original).  
 54. Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment: Adolescent Criminal Responsibility and LWOP 
Sentences, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 11, 31 (2007); see also JAMES ALAN FOX, TRENDS IN JUVENILE 
VIOLENCE: A REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL ON CURRENT AND FUTURE RATES 
OF JUVENILE OFFENDING (1996), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tjvfox.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WE6C-4MFS] (predicting a “future wave of youth violence that will be even worse 
than that of the past ten years”); MARK MAUER ET AL., THE MEANING OF “LIFE”: LONG PRISON 
SENTENCES IN CONTEXT 1 (2004), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/the-meaning-of-
life-long-prison-sentences-in-context/ [https://perma.cc/5D86-CVZ4] (“Over the past three decades 
the political climate in the United States has increasingly embraced ‘get tough’ policies as the 
primary focus of a crime control strategy.”); JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-
AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 65 (2d ed. 2011) (“[C]rime was being 
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DiIulio’s work, famously remarked, “[W]e have to bring 
[superpredators] to heel.”55  
“Superpredator” mania spurred federal and state governments 
toward harsh juvenile punishments that often proved ineffective. 
Congress soon passed, and President Clinton signed, the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,56 which authorized courts to 
try certain violent juvenile offenders as adults57 and increased juvenile 
penalties for firearm possession.58 Numerous states responded in kind, 
enacting harsher sentencing policies and “encouraging the trial of 
juvenile offenders in adult rather than juvenile courts.”59 Between 1992 
and 1999, forty-five states adopted laws expanding their courts’ 
jurisdictions over juveniles,60 and forty-eight states increased sanctions 
for violent juvenile offenders.61 In criminal court, where judges had 
little experience with juvenile justice, young offenders were essentially 
 
deliberately molded into a major issue, not on its merits, but through manipulation by politicians, 
Justice Department-funded researchers, and a media increasingly surviving on the sensational.”). 
 55. Hillary Clinton, First Lady, Remarks at Keene State College (Jan. 28, 1996). For a partial 
recording of this speech, see Robert Mackey, Hillary Clinton on “Superpredators” in 1996, C-SPAN 
(Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4582473/user-clip-hillary-clinton-superpredators-
1996 [https://perma.cc/J2KG-RQNZ]. 
 56. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 
1796 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); see Note, Mending the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Approach to Consideration of Juvenile Status, 130 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1002 (2017) 
[hereinafter Note, Mending the Federal Sentencing Guidelines] (“[C]ultural lore around the 
superpredator claim contributed to Congress enacting and President Clinton signing the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.”). 
 57. E.g., § 140001, 108 Stat. at 2031 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2012)) (allowing children 
as young as thirteen to be prosecuted as adults for assault, murder, and attempt to commit murder 
or manslaughter, as well as robbery, bank robbery, and aggravated sexual abuse if the offense 
involved possession of a firearm); § 140005, 108 Stat. at 2032 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 5038 (2012)) 
(requiring courts to transmit juvenile conviction records to the Federal Bureau of Investigation if 
the juvenile could have been tried as an adult for commission of any of the crimes encompassed by  
§ 140001). 
 58. See § 110201, 108 Stat. at 2010–12 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924 (2012)) (prohibiting, 
with exceptions, the knowing possession by a juvenile of a handgun or handgun-specific 
ammunition, and allowing imprisonment of violators). 
 59. State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 53–54 (Iowa 2013); see, e.g., Law of May 25, 1995, ch. 191, 
§ 8, 1995 Iowa Acts 462 (amending IOWA CODE § 232.8 to exclude juveniles sixteen and older from 
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for the alleged commission of certain offenses). 
 60. PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT, supra note 49, at 11; see also, SHAY BILCHIK, OFFICE OF 
JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN: CHALLENGING THE 
MYTHS 2 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/178993.pdf [https://perma.cc/7L6F-6T95] 
(“Nearly every State changed its laws to make it easier to handle more youth as adult criminals.”); 
PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STATE 
RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 3–9 (1996) http://www.ncjj.org/ 
pdf/statresp.pdf [https://perma.cc/WTJ8-YV3R] (“[L]egislatures have, since 1992, added 
significantly to the list of offenses now considered serious and/or lowered the age for which certain 
juveniles could be tried in criminal court.”).  
 61. Megan McCabe Jarrett, Student Work, Stifling the Shot at A Second Chance: Florida’s 
Response to Graham and Miller and the Missed Opportunity for Change in Juvenile Sentencing, 
45 STETSON L. REV. 499, 502–03 (2016). 
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treated as adults and “more often sentenced to prison and for longer 
periods of time than their adult counterparts.”62 While some federal and 
state courts would eventually reject the false equivalence between 
juveniles and adults,63 the superpredator myth continued to loom over 
many juvenile sentencing schemes: juvenile life without parole 
(“JLWOP”) became mandatory for certain offenses,64 and despite a 
decrease in the number of homicides by youths starting in 1994,65 there 
was a “nearly tenfold increase” in the use of JLWOP for homicides 
between 1990 and 1999.66  
Over time, the very notion of the juvenile superpredator 
unraveled. Indeed, the entire factual foundation for the superpredator 
has been repudiated by most of its adherents,67 including DiIulio and 
Fox, who admitted that their predictions were incorrect, explained how 
scientific findings invalidated the superpredator myth, and noted that 
the rise in punitive juvenile sentencing during the 1990s resulted from 
 
 62. Null, 836 N.W.2d at 54 (emphasis added) (citing Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, 
Consequences of Transfer, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF 
ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 227, 234–36 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 
2000)); see also Note, Mending the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 56, at 1002–03 
(quoting Congressional findings that “[j]uveniles transferred for trial as adults in federal court are 
essentially treated as adults”). 
 63. The Supreme Court has held that juveniles are fundamentally different from adults for 
sentencing purposes because they are less mature, more vulnerable to outside influences, more 
likely to experience transient character traits, and less likely to be deterred by harsh penalties. 
See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471–72 (2012) (“[C]hildren are constitutionally different from 
adults for purposes of sentencing. . . . Juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects 
for reform.”); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (noting “developments in psychology and 
brain science [that] continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds”); 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–73 (2005) (“[T]he same characteristics that render juveniles 
less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.”); see 
also State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 829 (Iowa 2016) (“[J]uveniles are less capable than adults of 
communicating with and giving meaningful assistance to their counsel.”); Brief of the American 
Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9, Miller, 567 U.S. 460 (Nos. 10-
9646, 10-9647), 2012 WL 166269, at *9 (“[S]entences for juvenile offenders must recognize that, no 
matter how adult-like their offenses, they are not adults.”). 
 64. See PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT, supra note 49, at 10 (“JLWOP sentencing policies were 
greatly expanded in response to this pseudo-science myth of the superpredator.”). 
 65. See id. at 11. 
 66. See id. at 12. According to another study, “in eleven out of the seventeen years between 
1985 and 2001, youth convicted of murder in the United States were more likely to enter prison 
with a life without parole sentence than adult murder offenders.” HUM. RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY 
INT’L, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2 (2005), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/TheRestofTheirLives.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7DVM-JUTS]. 
 67. According to a United States Surgeon General’s report, there is no evidence that youth in 
the early 1990s were involved in more violent crime than youth in earlier years. David S. 
Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, “Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused”: The Changing Legal 
Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 643 (2002) (citing DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 5 (2001)).  
        
2020] BROKEN RECORDS REVIEW 441 
“an environment of hysteria” rather than solid evidence.68 Public 
opinion has moved in a similar direction, with prior supporters of the 
superpredator myth facing significant backlash. Indeed, Hillary 
Clinton’s embrace of the superpredator myth proved harmful during 
her unsuccessful bid for the presidency in 2016.69  
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court’s occasional reliance on 
scientific evidence has brought about a mild decrease in some of the 
harshest penalties. For instance, in the 2005 case Roper v. Simmons, 
the Court ruled the death penalty unconstitutional for minors, in part 
based on “scientific and sociological studies” showing juveniles to be 
generally less mature, more impressionable, and less fixed in their 
personality traits than adults.70 In 2010, in Graham v. Florida, the 
Court prohibited JLWOP for nonhomicide offenses, reasoning that 
“developments in psychology and brain science continue to show 
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”71 Finally, 
in the 2012 case Miller v. Alabama, the court held mandatory JLWOP 
for murder unconstitutional, having found evidence in the amicus briefs 
that the “science and social science” undergirding Roper and Graham 
had further solidified.72  
State courts, drawing on the Supreme Court’s reliance on 
scientific data in Roper, Miller, and Graham, have gone further in 
directly addressing the problems wrought by the superpredator myth.73 
 
 68. Brief of Jeffrey Fagan et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 15–28, Miller, 
567 U.S. 460 (Nos. 10-9647, 10-9646), 2012 WL 174240, at *15–28. 
 69. See Anne Gearan & Abby Phillip, Clinton Regrets 1996 Remark on ‘Super-Predators’ After 
Encounter with Activist, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2016/02/25/clinton-heckled-by-black-lives-matter-activist/?noredirect=on&utm_term 
=.ac252d0de88a [https://perma.cc/H57U-UUP6] (quoting Hillary Clinton as stating, “Looking 
back, I shouldn’t have used those words, and I wouldn’t use them today” in response to a question 
at a 2016 fundraising event). 
 70. 543 U.S. 551, 569–70, 578 (2005). 
 71. 560 U.S. 48, 68, 82 (2010). 
 72. 567 U.S. 460, 471–72, 472 n.5 (2012). In the wake of Miller, numerous state legislatures 
and the District of Columbia have prohibited LWOP for all juvenile offenses. Fair Sentencing of 
Minors Act of 2017, 2017 Ark. Acts 539; Parole: Youth Offender Parole Hearings, 2017 Cal. Legis. 
Serv. 684 (West); 2016 Colo. Sess. Laws 1447; 2015 Conn. Acts 332 (Spec. Sess.); 79 Del. Laws ch. 
37 (2013); Comprehensive Youth Justice Amendment Act of 2016, 63 D.C. Reg. 15312, 15312–25 
(Dec. 16, 2016) (effective Apr. 2017); 2014 Haw. Sess. Laws 693; 2019 Or. Laws ch. 634;  2017 N.D. 
Laws 563; 2017 N.J. Laws 1320; 2015 Nev. Stat. 617; 2016 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 121 308; 2013 Tex. 
Gen. Laws 5020; Juvenile Sentencing Amendments, 2016 Utah Laws 1507; 2015 Vt. Acts & 
Resolves 209; 2014 W. Va. Acts 459; 2013 Wyo. Sess. Laws 75. The Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court similarly prohibited LWOP for juveniles in Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the 
Suffolk District, 1 N.E.3d 270, 284–85 (Mass. 2013). The Massachusetts legislature codified this 
prohibition the next year. 2014 Mass. Acts 832.  
 73. See State v. Bassett, 428 P.3d 343, 355 (Wash. 2018) (holding that JLWOP sentences 
violate the Washington State Constitution); State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 836–37, 839 (Iowa 
2016) (declaring JLWOP unconstitutional under the Iowa state constitution for all offenses); 
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For example, in Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court construed the “current 
scientific research on adolescent brain development” as irreconcilable 
with even discretionary JLWOP.74 The court held that because a 
juvenile’s brain is still developing—both structurally and functionally—
a conclusive finding of irretrievable depravity is never justified, and 
hence the imposition of a sentence as severe as JLWOP constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment.75 Likewise, in prohibiting discretionary 
JLWOP in State v. Sweet, the Iowa Supreme Court cited scientific briefs 
from the earlier U.S. Supreme Court cases76 to conclude that judicial 
assessments of juvenile rehabilitative prospects are “too speculative 
and likely impossible given what we now know about the timeline of 
brain development.”77 In light of these changes, the “overwhelming 
majority” of the JLWOP sentences that remain in force today were 
imposed during the 1990s.78 
B. Alternative Facts in Doctrinal Context 
With a few exceptions, constitutional rights doctrines have been 
designed without concern for rooting out this unique brand of legislative 
falsehood.79 The general tiers-of-scrutiny framework provides for 
heightened review in certain constitutional contexts, including laws 
that involve suspect or quasi-suspect classifications under the Equal 
Protection Clause80 and laws that burden fundamental rights, such as 
decisions around childbearing or marriage, under the Due Process 
 
Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 283–85 (holding that JLWOP sentences violate the Massachusetts 
Constitution, based partially on “current scientific evidence”). 
 74. 1 N.E.3d at 283–84. 
 75. Id. at 284–85. 
 76. 879 N.W.2d at 828–29, 839 (citing Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647), 
2012 WL 166269; Brief for the American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners, Miller, 567 U.S. 460 (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647), 2012 WL 174239; Brief for 
the American Medical Association and the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Graham, 560 U.S. 48 (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621), 2009 
WL 2247127).  
 77. Id. at 836–37.  
 78. See PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT, supra note 49, at 9. 
 79. One example of the exceptions to this proposition is abortion doctrine and its governing 
“undue burden” standard. The latest iteration of the standard calls for a balancing of claimed 
benefits against the burden—and for an examination of whether the challenged regulations are in 
fact “benefits.” See infra Section IV.B. 
 80. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996) (requiring an “exceedingly 
persuasive” justification for gender classifications (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 
U.S. 718, 724 (1982))); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding all 
racial classifications subject to strict scrutiny); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (subjecting 
discrimination against nonmarital children to intermediate scrutiny). 
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Clause.81 Further, a narrow prong of equal protection doctrine imposes 
strict scrutiny on laws that discriminate among people in the exercise 
of certain rights deemed fundamental, such as the right to vote82 and 
right to travel.83 Surviving heightened scrutiny requires meeting two 
elements: first, that the government objectives be sufficiently weighty, 
and, second, that the means employed fit those objectives closely.84 This 
prominent and widely used constitutional review framework is devoid 
of any explicit authorization to protect groups whose 
underrepresentation in legislative processes renders them vulnerable 
to the peddling of alternative facts in lawmaking. 
In practice, however, and despite the lack of explicit language to 
this effect, heightened scrutiny does involve factual analysis, which 
occasionally benefits out-groups prone to legislative stereotyping.85 But 
the result is often dissonant decisions that confront distorted legislative 
records by awkwardly tying that analysis back to the formal doctrine.86 
It is thus likely that courts, although occasionally willing to grapple 
with alternative facts under heightened scrutiny, do so less consistently 
 
 81. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–20 (1997) (“The Due Process 
Clause . . . provides heightened protection against government interference with certain 
fundamental rights and liberty interests.”); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 
(1977) (“[W]here a decision as fundamental as that whether to bear or beget a child is involved, 
regulations imposing a burden on it may be justified only by compelling state interests . . . .”); Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (explaining that governmental action limiting fundamental 
rights, in this case the right to privacy, “may be justified only by a ‘compelling state interest’ ”); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503–04 (1965) (“[S]tatutes regulating sensitive areas of 
liberty do, under the cases of this Court, require ‘strict scrutiny . . . .’ ”) (White, J., concurring). 
 82. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62, 566 (1964) (describing the right to vote as 
“a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society,” interference with which “must be 
carefully and meticulously scrutinized,” before holding that unequal-population voting districts 
offend the Equal Protection Clause “as much as invidious discriminations based upon factors such 
as race or economic status” (citation omitted)). 
 83. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (invalidating, on equal protection 
grounds, states’ conditioning of welfare eligibility on length of residence, because such 
classification “touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement” without “promot[ing] a 
compelling state interest”). 
 84. E.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (“[Racial] classifications are constitutional only if they are 
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.”); Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“[C]lassifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives 
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”).  
 85. Indeed, recent overhauls of certain constitutional areas, such as judicial review of 
government classifications based on gender, are often based on repudiations of traditionally held 
conceptions now considered to be factually baseless and illegitimate grounds for government 
action. See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (“The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or 
invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about 
the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.”); Craig, 429 U.S. at 199 (“[I]t 
was necessary that the legislatures choose either to realign their substantive laws in a gender-
neutral fashion, or to adopt procedures for identifying those instances where the sex-centered 
generalization actually comported with fact.”). 
 86. See infra Section IV.A; see also infra Section V.A. 
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and cogently than they would if factual review were formally integrated 
into the current doctrinal frameworks.87 
More recently, another avenue has formed. The doctrine of 
animus, which has its roots in equal protection cases but can be found 
in other areas of constitutional law, reflects the belief that “a 
bare . . . desire to harm a . . . group cannot constitute a legitimate 
governmental interest.”88 Animus is a transsubstantive doctrine that 
exhibits two primary features. First, it solidifies the simple order that 
government actions, in whatever context, should not be motivated by 
an intent to harm a class of people. Second, it invites inference from a 
variety of circumstances that animus may lurk beneath facially neutral 
government action. Animus is uncovered by examining the fit between 
the government action and the stated objective,89 deviations from 
trending cultural or constitutional norms,90 departures from procedural 
norms,91 and, importantly, for purposes of this Article, the validity of 
factual assertions advanced in support of a given law.92  
Not unlike heightened scrutiny, animus effectively but 
unofficially invites courts to look at facts. Yet, because it requires a 
showing of discriminatory intent against a group of people, the doctrine 
features a dissonance similar to that which appears under heightened 
scrutiny—tying factual analysis to a formal doctrine that does not 
explicitly authorize such investigation.93 This renders courts’ work 
 
 87.  See infra Section V.A. 
 88. E.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (emphasis omitted). 
 89. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447–50 (1985) (comparing the 
unsatisfying alleged purposes of a zoning ordinance requiring a special permit for homes for 
mentally disabled individuals with the actions taken); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534 (noting that “[t]he 
challenged statutory classification . . . is clearly irrelevant to the stated purposes of the Act”). 
 90. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 768 (2013) (finding that the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act upended a “history and tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage”); Romer 
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627–28 (1996) (noting that a state constitutional amendment prohibiting 
nondiscrimination protections for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals bucked “the structure and 
operation of modern antidiscrimination laws” and disrupted an “emerging tradition of statutory 
protection”).  
 91. Cf. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977) 
(noting how departures from ordinary procedures can be indicative of invidious intent). Though 
Arlington Heights is not often considered part of the anti-animus canon, it famously invites 
inference of discriminatory intent from context and circumstance. Id. 
 92. In Cleburne, for example, the Court used factual and logical contradictions and 
counterexamples to infer that government action “rest[s] on an irrational prejudice against the 
mentally [disabled].” 473 U.S. at 447–50. As explained infra in Section IV.A, the Supreme Court 
has generally preferred to engage in motivational analysis rather than confront factual invalidity 
head-on. 
 93. See, e.g., Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 927–
29 (2012) (interpreting Cleburne and Romer as “providing plaintiffs with an opportunity 
to . . . affirmatively prove the presence of unconstitutional animus through close examination of 
the connection between the identifying trait and the interests—both individual and 
governmental—implicated by the law”). 
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needlessly complicated and denies politically weak groups the benefit 
of a clear pronouncement from the judiciary that distorted legislative 
records will not go unnoticed. This gap in constitutional doctrine, and 
the judiciary’s awkward dance around it, is striking. Although nowhere 
does the doctrine formally authorize courts to employ factual analysis, 
they do so frequently in the heightened-scrutiny and animus realms, 
but less consistently and effectively than they might if given an explicit 
charge.  
Most problematic is the lowest tier of the framework—rational 
basis review. Though it requires that government actions have some 
“rational relation” to a set of stated (or even unstated) objectives,94 and 
though it originally presented a nonnegligible potential for invalidation 
of government actions,95 the doctrine evolved into a standard that 
greatly defers to the political branches.96 Needless to say, a doctrine of 
complete deference runs the risk of deferring to bogus legislative 
rationales as well.97 This gross doctrinal omission has helped render 
rational basis review toothless in most cases of lawmaking based on 
 
 94. E.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“[O]ur 
decisions . . . require . . . that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest.”); Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (requiring a 
regulatory classification to have “relation to the purpose for which it is made”). 
 95. Early rational basis review placed a burden on the challenger to introduce facts showing 
that there was no relation between the statute and its purported aims, a burden that “was difficult, 
but not impossible” to meet. Jackson, supra note 9, at 497–98. Over time, the rational basis test 
lost its impact as the judicial branch began conjecturing possible motives for the government’s 
legislation rather than accepting and evaluating only those offered by the government. This mode 
of decisionmaking, expressed in classic rational basis decisions such as United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–54 (1938) (restricting rational basis analysis “to the issue [of] 
whether any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for 
[the statute]”), took full force in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), 
when, rather than looking “at the actual evidence regarding the relation of the statute to its 
purported aims,” the court decided “it would consider only whether legislators might have thought 
the statute had a rational basis.” Jackson, supra note 9, at 503–04. This more lenient strand of 
rational basis review, and the large amounts of deference that it heralded, defines our current 
constitutional age, in which the Court has “effectively de-fang[ed] [its] scrutiny of legislation 
outside of preferred rights.” Id. at 503. 
 96. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2402 (2018) (describing the rational basis inquiry 
as “whether the . . . policy is plausibly related to the Government’s stated objective”); Heller v. Doe, 
509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (“[A] classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding 
along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity.”); Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303 
(“[R]ational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.”); Ry. 
Express, 336 U.S. at 110 (“It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus 
be eradicated or none at all.”). 
 97. Rational basis is deferential not only as to asserted facts, but also as to justifications. 
Under the doctrine, courts are authorized to suggest conceivable justifications for the law even if 
these were neither advanced by the government nor based in reality. See Williamson, 348 U.S. at 
487 (speculating about what the legislature might have concluded that led to the passage of the 
act); Ry. Express, 336 U.S. at 110 (speculating about what local authorities “may well have 
concluded” and noting that it would require omniscience to contradict those conclusions).  
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alternative facts,98 a deficiency with special importance for 
marginalized classes whose group characteristics may not qualify them 
for heightened-scrutiny protection and for whom legislative animus 
may be difficult to prove. The doctrine as it stands is thus ill-suited to 
confront the unique problem that arises when government actions are 
premised on affirmative distortions of fact.  
II. SCHOLARLY RESPONSES TO ALTERNATIVE FACTS 
Scholars who are concerned with the increasing salience of 
alternative facts in lawmaking tend to offer one of two solutions. Some 
argue that trial courts can and should take on the task of reviewing the 
legislative record, and the process by which the record was created, in 
spite of the concerns about judicial overreach that this raises.99 Others 
argue instead that trial courts should engage not in factfinding as such, 
but in expanded forms of motivational inquiry, a proposal more 
squarely grounded in current equal protection doctrine and 
methodology.100 But reframing the doctrine to consider broken 
legislative records might better respond to the problem that alternative 
facts pose for groups excluded from the lawmaking process without 
upending well-established norms about the separation of powers that 
underlie the otherwise enormously deferential posture courts apply to 
ordinary legislative acts under the rational basis doctrine.101 
 
 98. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 9, at 505 (“[T]he principles announced in Williamson v. Lee 
Optical essentially made the presumption of constitutionality irrebuttable.”); Neily, supra note 9, 
at 543 (describing the canonical rational basis test used in Williamson as “an essentially 
irrebuttable presumption that the government is pursuing constitutionally permissible ends, 
regardless of whether it actually is”). 
 99. Larsen, supra note 4, at 181–82 (“The traditional claim is that courts do not have the 
same fact-finding tools as legislatures and are thus not equipped to get the facts. . . [But to] protect 
constitutional law from alternative facts, we must empower courts to proactively guard against 
them—and judges must rise to meet the challenge.”). 
 100. Jackson, supra note 9, at 511–12 (arguing for a stricter rational basis test that asks 
whether the legislature “actually” thought the law was rationally related to the purpose); Neily, 
supra note 9, at 550; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (invalidating state 
constitutional amendment under rational basis review based on its animus against gays, lesbians, 
and bisexuals); Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 275–76 (1979) (declining to apply heightened 
scrutiny, notwithstanding the law’s disparate impact on women, when the challengers could not 
demonstrate discriminatory motive); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252, 264–66 (1977) (holding that discriminatory motive is the gravamen of a successful 
challenge to race-neutral government action); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) 
(establishing that the disparate racial impact of a law or policy generally does not trigger 
heightened scrutiny unless a discriminatory motive can be shown). 
 101. See supra Section I.B. 
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A. The Plenary Factfinding Model Versus the Intent-Based Model 
In her trenchant analysis of the constitutional implications of 
alternative facts, Allison Orr Larsen notes that America’s increasing 
political divide has “evolved into ‘my team-your team’ facts.”102 Thus, 
“[w]hether one believes climate change is man-made or voter fraud is 
an epidemic, for example, may well depend on one’s political 
affiliation.”103 In light of an increasing abundance of myth-based 
legislation, Larsen believes the judiciary should be empowered to more 
closely scrutinize legislative facts, and particularly the process used to 
generate them.104 As compared to the legislature, which may be more 
inclined to feed the polarization vortex with alternative facts, courts 
have stronger incentives to “focus on the sources of the facts,” producing 
outcomes more aligned with their truth-seeking function.105  
Responding to traditionalist understandings that courts lack the 
institutional competency to digest factual information at a wholesale 
level, Larsen argues that courts can actually retain factfinding powers 
because of judges’ engrained norms of professional judgment, their 
position in the adversarial process, and larger institutional 
incentives.106 Judges, equipped with specialized legal training, are 
better able to sort the wheat from the chaff and resist the cognitive bias 
that leads others to accept alternative facts as truth.107 Because trial 
courts are well equipped to evaluate process108 as compared to 
legislative purpose, judicial deference to the legislature should be 
calibrated to the depth of the legislature’s fact-checking process.109 For 
example, a court could consider whether the hearing that generated a 
 
 102. Larsen, supra note 4, at 190–91. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 182. 
 105. Id. at 223. 
 106. Id. at 182, 220–23. 
 107. See id. at 223 (“[C]ourts also seem to already possess a resistance to the infection that is 
plaguing the political discourse.”). 
 108. Id. at 237 (“[J]udges are good at evaluating process.”); see also Sidney A. Shapiro & 
Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the 
Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 407 (noting the legal 
process conception of judicial review and its emphasis on “the relative institutional competence of 
courts, legislatures and agencies to make and implement social policy decisions”).  
 109. See Larsen, supra note 4, at 218, 234. In making this argument, Larsen draws on the 
argument made by Dan Kahan and others, who posit that judges’ “situation sense,” developed 
through professional training, equips them with an increased capacity to focus purely on the facts 
pertinent to the resolution of a case and resist the distortion of myths and alternative facts. Dan 
M. Kahan et al., “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental Investigation of Motivated 
Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 355 (2016). 
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legislative finding was impartial or unduly partisan, and adjust its 
deference accordingly.110 
As an alternative to Larsen’s transsubstantive approach,111 
Caitlin Borgmann provides a narrower take on the judicial role in 
addressing alternative facts, arguing that courts should reexamine the 
underlying factual predicates of laws that curtail individual rights.112 
In such cases, enhanced factual review would apply regardless of 
whether the law triggered heightened scrutiny113 and irrespective of the 
quality of the legislature’s factfinding process. Courts would thus have 
authority to review legislative facts in all rights cases, even where the 
legislature adhered to a sound and objective factfinding process or 
engaged in purely values-based decisionmaking, provided that the law 
potentially curtailed some constitutionally protected individual right.114 
Other scholars, focusing less on the issue of alternative facts as 
such, but seemingly preoccupied by similar concerns, have argued for 
more judicial scrutiny of legislative purpose in virtually every case. 
Clark Neily, a proponent of an expanded motivational inquiry, reasons 
that courts have the capacity and capability to identify true legislative 
intent in all cases and that a decision made on anything less than an 
inquiry into genuine intent is an abdication of the judicial mandate.115 
For rational basis review to be meaningful, the court cannot merely 
defer to the government to present any conceivable rational 
relationship between means and ends, nor can it blindly accept its own 
conjecture.116 Doing so would too often permit, if not invite, arbitrary 
legislation. The onus is thus on the court, using its subjective faculties 
of reason and judgment, to determine, based on the facts presented, 
 
 110.  See Larsen, supra note 4, at 234. 
 111. Larsen analogizes her proposed framework to two fixtures of administrative law—
Chevron Step Zero on the one hand and “hard look” review on the other. See id. at 235–36. 
 112. Borgmann, supra note 10, at 3. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 49. 
 115. See Neily, supra note 9, at 550 (“[W]hen judges do not ask what the government is really 
up to—which they typically do not, since the rational basis test is the default standard in 
constitutional law—judges are no more engaged in adjudication than when they decide cases by 
coin toss . . . .”); see also Jackson, supra note 9, at 511–12 (arguing for a return to classical rational 
basis review that would require courts to inquire into the actual purpose of the legislation). 
 116. See Neily, supra note 9, at 555 (arguing that “the modern rational basis test,” by “deciding 
constitutional cases on the basis of government-favoring conjecture and surmise instead of a good-
faith effort to get at the objective truth,” is “an epistemologically incoherent, intellectually 
indefensible, and conscience-shocking ‘test’ ”); cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test Is 
Constitutional (and Desirable), 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 410 (2016) (“[A]ny permissible 
purpose should continue to be sufficient to meet the rational basis test, but . . . courts should focus 
on the actual purpose of the legislature rather than ask whether there is a conceivable permissible 
purpose.”).  
        
2020] BROKEN RECORDS REVIEW 449 
that the law does not bear the taint of improper motive such that it 
actually is rationally related to its stated purpose.117  
B. Critiques of Current Proposals 
While the preceding proposals to address alternative facts have 
their appeal, they suffer from potential drawbacks. For example, there 
are problems with empowering judges across the board to engage in de 
novo review of the legislative process. Such a proposition risks turning 
some of the most basic separation-of-powers principles on their heads, 
especially the ordinary presumption that courts lack the competence to 
sit as superlegislatures and second-guess legislative procedure. Such a 
proposal could bring upheaval to the court system, clogging dockets 
with an endless stream of “independent, case-by-case assessments of 
the fairness of statutory classifications [that] would invite excessive 
litigation and generate unpredictable and conflicting results.”118 In any 
event, as explained below, such a remedy may not be necessary to cure 
the problem of alternative-fact-based lawmaking.  
While plenary judicial review of the factfinding process seems 
appealing from the standpoint of vindicating individual rights, it can 
also be used to undo protections for marginalized groups by judges who 
are more prone to rule based on their cognitive or cultural biases. 
Borgmann’s more tailored approach might seem responsive to this 
concern, as it would require more searching review of a law’s factual 
foundations only when individual rights are at stake. But this assumes 
that a given judge’s inability to distinguish fact from farce would not 
undermine his or her ability to discern a threat to individual rights, 
when in fact the analyses seem intertwined.  
Proposals advocating closer review of actual legislative purpose, 
for their part, run into other difficulties. First, these approaches 
overlook the built-in limitations and inherent complications of 
discerning governmental intent, a task often rendered impossible when 
a discriminatory motive hides behind facially neutral statutory 
language.119 A further pitfall arises if laws grounded in alternative facts 
 
 117. Jackson, supra note 9, at 511–12. 
 118. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 64–65 
(1997); see also Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213–20 (1978) (discussing institutional 
considerations underlying the judicial reluctance to enforce the U.S. Constitution to its fullest 
extent).  
 119. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997) (tracking the intent doctrine’s inability 
to keep up with the evolving “ways in which the legal system enforces social stratification”); Kenji 
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 764 (2011) (enumerating the many 
        
450 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:2:425 
have multiple explanations, including—but not limited to—invidious 
intent. Even more difficult are scenarios in which perfectly well-
intentioned legislatures find themselves engaging in lawmaking based 
on faulty information; in such cases, a stepped-up intent inquiry leads 
to a dead end. An intent-based model could even license the trafficking 
in alternative facts, provided that such facts are not illustrative of 
improper motive and are the basis for facially neutral legislation. Such 
scenarios are especially likely where the subject of a legislature’s faulty 
deliberation is a group without the political voice necessary to prevent 
the majority’s unthinking assumptions from taking deeper root.  
These drawbacks weigh in favor of crafting an objective test with 
a more limited judicial role in reexamining the legislative process. In 
that vein, focusing on the narrower and more concrete problem of 
broken legislative records—rooting out alternative facts, myths, or 
conspiracy theories through a pragmatic, neutral inquiry into the 
factual and evidentiary arguments made in support of a given piece of 
legislation—provides an appealing alternative, especially for the 
purpose of protecting politically underrepresented groups. Unlike 
models that would in effect require the government to subjectively 
persuade the court of the sufficiency of a law’s factual foundation in 
many, if not all, cases, broken records review, more modestly, empowers 
courts to consider the arguably more familiar question of whether any 
rational legislator could have found the factual foundation sufficient. 
III. INTRODUCING BROKEN RECORDS REVIEW 
Broken records review addresses the acute vulnerability of 
politically marginalized groups to myth-based legislation more squarely 
than either plenary factfinding or enhanced motivational review. 
Procedurally, it bears a resemblance to summary judgment in that it 
requires the government to meet a basic evidentiary threshold in a 
preliminary hearing, and thus it would not demand a dramatic 
expansion of the judiciary’s repertoire. Moreover, broken records 
review, although technically resolved before a case is assigned to a 
particular tier of scrutiny, indirectly reinvigorates the traditional 
transsubstantive rights doctrines and complements their underlying 
mission. First, it revives the concept of rational basis review by 
highlighting how that inquiry, properly understood, contemplates a 
threshold assessment of the factual assertions made in support of a 
given law—at least on some occasions. Second, when a law predicated 
 
pitfalls of intent-driven doctrine, including the opportunity for legislators of ordinary 
sophistication to whitewash their true motives out of discriminatory measures). 
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on alternative facts contains a suspect classification or burdens a 
fundamental right, broken records review empowers a court to confront 
the problem head-on, rather than contort its analysis to fit a 
heightened-scrutiny doctrine that does not formally authorize myth-
busting. Finally, broken records review offers a more promising vehicle 
than animus doctrine for smoking out and invalidating laws based on 
impermissible stereotyping. Indeed, a broken records analysis may 
even vindicate leading constitutional cases by offering a superior 
explanation for the correctness of their outcomes.120 As courts begin to 
recognize that laws are tainted not because they are the product of 
improper motivation (assuming such intent can even be known),121 but 
rather because those laws are predicated on the peddling of distortions 
and falsehoods, the benefits and utility of a broken records approach 
become increasingly clear.122  
A. The Mechanics of Broken Records Review 
Under broken records review, a party challenging the 
constitutionality of a given piece of legislation would have an 
opportunity in a preliminary hearing to alert the court to certain telltale 
signs of alternative-fact-based lawmaking. Depending on the context, 
these might include the government’s failure during the enactment 
process to produce credible examples of the evil allegedly targeted,123 an 
avalanche of counterexamples vastly outnumbering the government’s 
supporting examples,124 or “facts” propounded by the legislature that 
are roundly refuted by scientific data125 or by the government’s own 
evidence.126 As such, broken records review would offer politically 
marginalized groups an opportunity to confront, through litigation, the 
 
 120. See infra Part IV. 
 121. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 122. Broken records review arguably takes the court closer to its judicial roots by examining a 
piece of legislation according to the legislature’s proposed purposes and avoiding any conjecture 
into what it thinks the legislature’s aims, animus, or possible rationales for laws were. See supra 
note 95 and accompanying text. But even compared to the classical rational basis test, broken 
records review is different: it tests the accuracy of the government’s stated justifications for a given 
law rather than looking for a link between the piece of legislation and its proposed aims. 
 123. See infra Section IV.A.3. 
 124. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 156–57 
(1980) (contending that courts should be skeptical of legislation when there are a high number of 
counterexamples, but especially so when there is a “generalization whose incidence of 
counterexample is significantly higher than the legislative authority appears to have thought it 
was”); infra Section IV.A.1. 
 125. See infra Section IV.B. 
 126. See infra Section IV.A.3. 
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type of factual distortions they might have rooted out in the legislative 
process had they been given the chance. 
Should a claimant’s unrebutted proof of any such defect 
persuade the court that the legislation is predicated on the propagation 
of alternative facts—meaning that no rational legislator could have 
supported its enactment—the burden would shift to the government to 
demonstrate that the legislative ends were indeed grounded in some 
objective measure of basic truth or rationality. And should the 
government fail to carry its burden without resort to post hoc 
rationalizations—that is, solely by reference to the statutory text or 
legislative history—the law would fail. 
A challenger’s burden under broken records review would thus 
be substantial, but not insurmountable. As a basic matter, challenged 
legislation would fail where the court is satisfied that no rational 
legislator in possession of all relevant facts could have expected the law 
to serve the narrative(s) asserted by the legislature during the 
enactment process. Or, as Justice White recognized in Vance v. Bradley, 
the threshold for refuting the government’s justification should be 
whether the government could reasonably believe its assertions.127 
Importantly, however, should a broken records challenge fail, ordinary 
means-ends analysis would reactivate. So, for example, if no suspect 
classification or fundamental right were implicated, the court would be 
bound to vindicate (as it does under current doctrine) any rational 
relationship between the means and the ends—whether argued by the 
government or hypothesized by the court.128  
Moreover, broken records review does not displace the deference 
courts pay to the mechanisms chosen by legislatures to engage in 
factfinding—whether through committee structure, expert testimony, 
open floor debate, or otherwise.129 Most matters of legislative process 
will remain within the province of the legislature,130 just like most fact-
 
 127. See 440 U.S. 93, 111–12 (1979) (sustaining mandatory retirement at age sixty for federal 
Foreign Service personnel and noting that in “an equal protection case of this type, . . . those 
challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on which 
the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the 
governmental decisionmaker”). 
 128. See discussion supra notes 94–95. 
 129. Notably, there are certain constitutional contexts in which courts appear to scale 
deference based on the extent to which the political branches follow (or fail to follow) ordinary, 
well-established and time-honored procedural norms. See generally Landau, supra note 8. 
 130. Cf. Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976). While Linde 
did not believe that courts should review the means used to pass legislation such as considering 
evidence, attending committee meetings, or reading a bill before casting a vote, see id. at 224–27, 
he noted that other mandates (constitutional and otherwise) pertaining to the qualifications of 
legislators, terms of office, reapportionment, and voting and quorum requirements raise important 
questions regarding what, if any, judicial response might be warranted. Id. at 240–42. 
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based disputes remain within the province of the jury.131 Instead, 
broken records review addresses the unique problem that arises when 
legislatures affirmatively distort the record, claiming to address harms 
that in reality do not exist. 
B. Broken Records and Threshold Determinations 
The features of broken records review can be further explained, 
and legitimated, by analogy to other hallowed processes courts 
routinely engage in along the fact/law distinction—summary judgment 
especially.132 Just as a judge can, as a matter of law, enter judgment 
against a party lacking evidence in support of a claim for relief, so can 
a judge require, as a purely legal matter, that the legislature meet a 
basic evidentiary threshold where it advances factual arguments in 
support of a given policy. In that regard, dubious factual predicates for 
state action raise the same kinds of legal red flags as claims in which 
there is insufficient evidence to support a prima facie case. And just as 
a party moving for summary judgment must discharge an initial burden 
before the court will entertain the inquiry,133 so must a challenger point 
out the likely existence of alternative-fact-based lawmaking to trigger 
broken records review. Importantly, neither summary judgment nor 
broken records review performs a qualitative assessment of the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of the substantive merits; rather, the court 
in each case addresses the likelihood that no reasonable juror (at 
summary judgment) or legislator (under broken records review) could 
find evidence substantiating one or more elements of the nonmoving 
party’s cause of action or in support of the legislative narrative 
propounded in favor of a law, respectively. Thus, both broken records 
review and summary judgment are an outer boundary, set by the court, 
 
 131. See infra Section III.B (exploring the analogy between broken records review and 
summary judgment). 
 132. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.”). The same standard is applied to motions for judgment as a matter of law, both 
during and after trial (pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a) and FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b), respectively). 
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (“[The] standard [for granting summary 
judgment] mirrors the standard for a directed verdict.” (alterations in original) (quoting Anderson 
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986))). 
 133. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial 
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying” the sources 
“which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact”); Bias v. Advantage 
Int’l, Inc., 905 F.2d 1558, 1560 (1990) (“The Supreme Court has stated that the moving party 
always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and 
identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine 
issue of material fact.”).   
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regarding a threshold level of legal acceptability.134 A litigant who 
establishes a modicum of evidence still has the right to trial, and a law 
whose justificatory rationale appears to be predicated on factual 
content still receives rational basis review (or whichever level of 
scrutiny is appropriate under the circumstances). But when a litigant, 
or legislative body, promotes only frivolous arguments, based entirely 
on falsehoods or innuendo, judges are permitted—indeed, required—to 
intercede on behalf of that judicially set boundary when the parties call 
on them to do so.135 
Just as the ambiguous fact/law distinction can create 
uncertainty around summary judgment standards,136 the precise 
contours of broken records review will be subject to debate. Judges 
disagree about how much evidence suffices to satisfy a minimum 
evidentiary standard at summary judgment, and judgment calls around 
the precise boundary for broken records review will be no different:137 
 
 134. Scholars have subjected summary judgment to withering criticism. See, e.g., Suja A. 
Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007) (arguing that 
summary judgment violates the Seventh Amendment); see also John Bronsteen, Against Summary 
Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 526 (2007) (“I think that the civil justice system would 
actually enjoy a net benefit from abolishing summary judgment, in terms of both efficiency and 
fairness.”); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil 
Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705 (2007) (detailing a series of interconnected ways that summary 
judgment diminishes the voice of individual—especially female—litigants). 
 135. In addition to summary judgment, recent changes to pleading standards under FED. R. 
CIV. P. 8(a)(2) arguably provide an additional analogy to broken records review. In Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007), the Supreme Court required that claimants, to avoid a motion 
to dismiss, must provide “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest . . . plausible 
grounds . . . at the pleading stage.” The Court reiterated that standard in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009) (requiring that a pleading be “supported by factual allegations,” not “mere 
conclusory statements”). These recent interpretations of Rule 8 have not gone without criticism. 
See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under 
Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 17–18 (2010) (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal, 
by invigorating motions to dismiss for inadequate pleading, have replicated the problems with 
summary judgment, calling into question those decisions’ legitimacy). 
 136. Commentators have noted the vexing distinction between questions of law and fact. See 
Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 
1769 (2003) (“The importance of the law-fact distinction is surpassed only by its mysteriousness.”); 
William W. Schwarzer, Alan Hirsch & David J. Barrans, The Analysis and Decision of Summary 
Judgment Motions: A Monograph on Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 139 F.R.D. 
441, 454 (1992) (“What is a ‘fact’ for summary judgment purposes is neither intuitively obvious nor 
easily determined. The rule itself contains no definition or other guidance. But this is not unique 
to Rule 56. The distinction between fact and law has long bedeviled common-law courts.”). Courts 
have made similar observations. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) 
(noting “the vexing nature of the distinction between questions of fact and questions of law”).  
 137. Although broken records review—like summary judgment—empowers the judge to 
consider the amount and quality of evidence supporting one party’s position, the inquiry is confined 
within narrow procedural parameters. For broken records review to commence, a challenger must 
first materialize. And should that challenger fail to persuade the court that no reasonable 
legislator could have believed a law’s stated rationale, the judge must resume a deferential posture 
toward the government’s factual claims. 
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some judges will require a mere “scintilla” and others may require 
more.138 But such disagreements among judges are typical—if not 
healthy—and should be embraced as part of a natural evolutionary 
legal process in such contexts. While broken records review may thus 
at times require courts to venture into the foggy overlap between law 
and fact,139 the inquiry is familiar—and in many ways analogous to the 
kinds of mixed questions of law and fact that courts routinely adjudicate 
in a variety of different situations.140  
C. Broken Records Review and Values Legislation 
Broken records review looks at facts relied on, in all likelihood, 
in bad faith. But it is not concerned with the bad faith itself. Thus, while 
it might often arise in situations where litigants also attempt to prove 
animus, the narrow scope of broken records review does not involve 
consideration of the legislature’s subjective intent. Whether the factual 
predicates of a state act are furthered out of duplicity is immaterial. 
The factual predicates themselves are all that broken records review 
considers. As a result, broken records review is not conceived to address 
purely values-based legislation. State actions which, on their face, 
purport simply to further a purely moral end may leave no factual trail 
for broken records review to follow. Only when proponents of values 
legislation seek to redouble the justification for their actions by citing 
alternative facts does broken records review activate. Of course, the 
added flexibility that broken records review affords would not preclude 
litigants from making full use of other tools at their disposal, such as 
animus review, for which an intent-based inquiry is appropriate.   
 
 138. In the context of summary judgment, compare Manok v. Southeast District Bowling Ass’n, 
306 F. Supp. 1215, 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (“Such a drastic procedure should be used sparingly so 
that no plaintiff, having a scintilla of merit to his cause should be denied his day in court.”), and 
Morgan v. Sylvester, 125 F. Supp. 380, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff’d, 220 F.2d 758 (2d Cir. 1955) 
(finding that a scintilla of evidence is sufficient to preclude summary judgment), with Patterson v. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 959, 121 F.3d 1345 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that a 
movant “must produce more than a ‘mere scintilla’ of evidence to avoid summary judgment” 
(quoting City of Vernon v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 1369 (9th Cir. 1992)), and Brownell 
v. Figel, 950 F.2d 1285, 1289 (7th Cir. 1991) (“A scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmovant’s 
position is insufficient to successfully oppose summary judgment.”).   
 139. See discussion supra note 136. 
 140. Judges commonly engage in factfinding as part of a broader inquiry. See Stuart Minor 
Benjamin, Stepping Into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 
78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 273–75 (1999) (discussing the centrality of both adjudicative and legislative 
facts to constitutional jurisprudence); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. 
L. REV. 229, 261–62 (1985) (noting the manifold forms of “constitutional fact review” generally 
conducted by the Supreme Court); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional 
Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1047–51 (2003) (discussing the 
importance of judicial factfinding in adjudicating patent disputes). 
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IV. BROKEN RECORDS AND THE CURRENT JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO 
ALTERNATIVE FACTS 
Courts have shown varying levels of interest and ability in 
confronting dubious factual predicates to state action. In some areas, as 
public opinion and scientific consensus have converged, courts have 
followed in kind—occasionally even citing the scientific literature along 
the way.141 In other areas, courts have expressly relied on discredited 
science.142 But more often, courts, perhaps leery of trammeling on 
legislative domain, have steered entirely clear of rigorous (or otherwise) 
inquiry into false or made-up legislative rationales, leaving politically 
excluded groups exposed to myth-grounded abuse. When alternative 
facts have arisen in an equal protection challenge, courts have tended 
to groove their analysis into intent or, on more limited occasions, 
animus review. When alternative facts have arisen in the substantive 
due process context, courts have sidestepped any direct confrontation 
by instead grounding the claim for relief in a more established doctrinal 
tool, such as liberty analysis, or again by interpreting the challenged 
law through the lens of the animus doctrine. 
A. Broken Records Review and Equal Protection 
1. Cleburne and the Judicial Reaction to Legislative Panic  
Traces of broken records review can be found in a small number 
of critical equal protection rulings. For example, the concept arguably 
explains the outcome in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.143 
Cleburne invalidated, under rational basis review, a town’s 
requirement that a group home for mentally disabled individuals secure 
a special housing permit that other group homes were not required to 
obtain.144 Justice White’s majority opinion expressed a clear preference 
for applying rational basis review rather than elevating the particular 
group involved—mentally disabled individuals—for special scrutiny, at 
least in cases where the underlying law appeared to lack any reasonable 
empirical basis.145 Indeed, Cleburne noted, nothing in the record 
provided support for the city’s special permit requirement.146 First, the 
city’s insistence on a special permit was based on concerns about the 
 
 141. See supra Section I.A.3. 
 142. See infra Section IV.A.2. 
 143. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 144. Id. at 447–50. 
 145. Id. at 442–48. 
 146. Id. at 448. 
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“negative attitude[s]” of nearby residents and “the fears” of others living 
close by.147 “But mere negative attitudes, or fear . . . are not permissible 
bases for treating a home for the mentally [disabled] differently from 
apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the like.”148 Another basis 
for the special permit—that students at a nearby high school might 
harass mentally disabled residents living at the home—was 
undermined by a critical counterexample: “[T]he school itself is 
attended by about 30 mentally [disabled] students.”149 In any event, the 
Court explained, it is constitutionally impermissible to render policy 
decisions based on nothing more than “vague, undifferentiated 
fear[ ].”150 The Court recognized, in sum, that “requiring [a] permit in 
this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the 
mentally [disabled].”151 
Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion also underscored the idea 
that a law based on distorted factual information presents unique 
concerns where groups excluded from the ordinary political process are 
concerned. “The term ‘rational,’ ” he wrote:  
includes a requirement that an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the 
classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the 
members of the disadvantaged class. Thus, the word “rational” . . . includes elements of 
legitimacy and neutrality that must always characterize the performance of the 
sovereign’s duty to govern impartially. . . . We do not need to apply a special standard, or 
to apply “strict scrutiny,” or even “heightened scrutiny” . . . [when the record in this case] 
convinces me that this permit was required because of the irrational fears of neighboring 
property owners, rather than for the protection of the mentally [disabled] persons who 
would reside in respondent’s home. I cannot believe that a rational member of this 
disadvantaged class could ever approve of the discriminatory application of the city’s 
ordinance in this case.152 
Of course, as an archetypal excluded class, the mentally disabled 
had no chance to register their disapproval of the ordinance at the 
legislative phase, much less dismantle its false premises. Cleburne thus 
represents the idea that courts possess an ability to provide protection 
to such groups by uncovering factual distortions within the 
government’s arguments, and that the presence of a broken record 
provides a means to strike down a law on rational basis grounds.153  
 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 449. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 450. 
 152. Id. at 452–55 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). 
 153. See id. at 447–450.  
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2. The Gay Rights Cases and Proto-Broken Records Review 
Historically, there are few areas of legislative interest in which 
alternative facts have played as prominent a role—both in shepherding 
public opinion and within statehouses themselves—as in the regulation 
of LGBT individuals and couples. Although the legacy of anti-LGBT 
ordinances can be traced back to well before the Revolution, the 
mobilization of contrived and questionable factual premises to support 
the subordination of LGBT Americans is a comparatively new 
phenomenon that did not begin in earnest until the twentieth 
century.154 Though derived from varied sources, and taking varied 
forms, these suspect factual predicates have at least one thing in 
common: they played a very insignificant role in Supreme Court 
decisions toppling a wave of antigay laws. As much as the Supreme 
Court’s gay rights jurisprudence is often the basis for celebration, it is 
striking how little the Court attended to the scurrilous underpinnings 
of many of those laws. 
a. Antisodomy Laws and Alternative Facts 
Beginning in the 1940s and 1950s, amid “concern[s] about 
domestic security against child molesters and homosexuals,” state 
legislatures began to dramatically expand efforts to restrict, regulate, 
and ratchet up enforcement against homosexuals.155 A few decades 
later, armed with a renewed moral fervor, trumpeting the devastation 
of the AIDS epidemic, and goaded by an increasingly adversarial 
scientific consensus,156 the Religious Right would modernize the 
rhetoric surrounding these concerns, crystalizing what would become 
the late-century anti-LGBT one-two punch of scripture-driven and 
“fact”-based rhetoric.157 This approach allowed anti-LGBT organizers to 
 
 154. See DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 5 (2012); 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA 1861–2003, at 1–
6 (2008).  
 155. ESKRIDGE, supra note 154, at 90. It was not until the rise of the gay rights movement in 
the 1970s, by which point a critical mass of scientific literature debunking many of the most 
devoutly held “factual” homophobic prejudices had accumulated, that many states began to roll 
back their antisodomy laws. See id; see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE 
APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 60–61 (1999) (describing a public outcry that grew in response to 
publicized sexual assaults on children). 
 156. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 154, at 174 (“[A]fter 1973,” when the American Psychiatric 
Association no longer considered homosexuality a mental disease, “medical science was officially 
hostile not only to consensual sodomy laws, but also to most state laws having a discriminatory 
impact on lesbians and gay men”). 
 157. See Marie-Amélie George, Bureaucratic Agency: Administering the Transformation of 
LGBT Rights, 36 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 122–23 (2017) (“The anti-gay activism of the Religious 
Right became a hallmark of its politics in 1977 after Anita Bryant launched a voter referendum 
        
2020] BROKEN RECORDS REVIEW 459 
shape popular opinion by serving public health fears to voters, while 
also giving legislators and courts cover to make decisions on moral-
majority grounds.158 
Broadly, antisodomy laws “codified a particular cultural 
assumption about homosexuals as hypersexualized and dangerous.”159 
Though not, on their face, targeted only at homosexual activity, they 
stemmed directly from the conflation of homosexuality, pedophilia, and 
generally lewd or predatory conduct.160 In fact, even when considering 
moderate reform to antisodomy laws, states still tended to drift into 
stereotypes lacking factual merit; the Texas legislature’s ultimate 1968 
decision to reduce the penalty for same-sex offenses from a class B to a 
class C misdemeanor was not one of compassion, but rather based on 
“the suspicion that gay men would relish the opportunity to spend time 
in an all-male prison.”161 
These sorts of stereotypes, facilitated by the effective exclusion 
(and silencing) of LGBT individuals from open participation in 
legislative politics, were not confined to antisodomy legislation. 
Consistent with the addition of medical language to the traditional 
morality-based anti-LGBT rhetoric, the conflation of homosexuality 
with predatory conduct had already launched a fleet of “sexual 
 
campaign to overturn Miami’s sexual orientation non-discrimination law.”). In 1977, when the 
Arkansas legislature elected to revive its law criminalizing “deviate sexual intercourse,” but now 
“only if between persons of the same sex,” one state senator succinctly summarized the dual values-
based and “fact”-based roots typical of the era’s anti-LGBT legislation: “This bill is aimed at 
weirdos and queers who live in fairyland world and are trying to wreck family life.” ESKRIDGE, 
supra note 154, at 202. 
 158. For the sake of illustration: this “one-two punch” straddles the divide between the 
legislative rationales that broken records review can and cannot reach. To the increasing extent 
that legislatures began to expressly use it to justify their actions, the questionable, often roundly 
rejected, science stoking these public health fears falls squarely within broken records review’s 
wheelhouse. See infra Section IV.A.2. But actions justified on a purely values-driven, moral, or 
even scriptural basis are beyond broken records review’s reach, though of course these actions 
remain susceptible to various forms of intent-based challenges, including animus review. See infra 
Section IV.A. 
 159. CARPENTER, supra note 154, at 16. 
 160. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 154, at 93 (noting that during his stint as Governor of 
California, future Chief Justice Earl Warren encouraged the expansion of much harsher sex 
perversion laws “to include the thousands of persons (almost all of them homosexual men) 
convicted of lewd vagrancy, a crime with an infinitely elastic definition”). In Florida, the prolifically 
anti-LGBT Johns Committee, a wing of the state legislature, justified its recommendation for the 
state to enact stringent antihomosexuality measures by stating that “[t]he homosexual’s goal and 
part of his satisfaction is to ‘bring over’ the young person, to hook him for homosexuality.” Id. at 
229. Similar concerns abounded in Texas, where a 1960s movement to reform the state sodomy 
laws was met with worried discussion regarding the “colonies of homosexuals in hotels” rumored 
to have spawned after a similar reform attempt had been codified in Illinois. See id. at 164.  
 161. See CARPENTER, supra note 154, at 11–12. The legislature had been guided in this 
direction by the longtime University of Texas School of Law Dean John Keeton’s proposed draft of 
the revisions—per Keeton, “imprisonment itself is very much like throwing Br’er Rabbit in the 
briar patch.” ESKRIDGE, supra note 154, at 164. 
        
460 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:2:425 
psychopath” laws that resulted in the indefinite institutionalization of 
Americans engaged in sexual activity between consenting adults.162 
Later, even as sexual psychopathy laws fell out of favor, and as some 
states began to roll back their antisodomy legislation and/or 
enforcement, the close of the twentieth century saw a rise in laws 
restricting or removing the ability of LGBT Americans to adopt children 
or serve as foster parents.163 Although these laws were often justified, 
and then defended, using “values” language, they were also regularly 
grounded in alternative fact, discredited science,164 and falsifiable 
stereotypes: for example, that gays and lesbians lived violent and 
“unstable” lives,165 risked “infecting” their children, and were 
predisposed to child molestation.166 
 
 162. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 154, at 95, 107; see also George, supra note 157, at 105 
(remarking that sexual psychopathy laws were generally enacted in response to public outrage 
over child abuse, by a public who “equated homosexuality with pedophilia,” and therefore it was 
“not surprising that the statutes contained clear homophobic undertones”). 
 163. See Kari E. Hong, Parens Patri[archy]: Adoption, Eugenics, and Same-Sex Couples, 40 
CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 40 (2003) (documenting that when New Hampshire and Florida first passed 
adoption bans for LGBT parents, they produced no “evidence of harm that children raised by gay 
people experienced,” instead relying on the perception that they were “morally inferior”). A Florida 
state legislator, defending Florida’s statute, explained that homosexuals are “ ‘an abomination’ in 
God’s eyes,” a stance Florida later defended in court as “permissibly ‘reflect[ing] the State’s moral 
disapproval of homosexuality.’ ” Id. at 40–41; see also Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 
1382 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (“According to Defendants, homosexuality has been long disfavored in the 
law based on beliefs firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards for a 
millenni[um].”), aff’d sub nom. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 
804 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 164. The state of Utah defended its ban by citing several purportedly scientific studies: Paul 
Cameron’s infamous 1993 study—gleaned from a sample of obituaries published during the height 
of the AIDS epidemic—claiming that homosexual men and women have decreased life expectancy. 
Hong, supra note 163, at 45. Cameron later “resigned from the American Psychological Association 
to avoid an investigation into charges of his unethical conduct as psychologist.” Id. His data 
analysis was later found to be so distorted that a Texas federal court considered it paramount to 
testimonial “misrepresentation.” Id. at 45–46. Another study, authored by a member of the 
scientific advisory board of a group that considers homosexuality to be a treatable developmental 
disorder, warned that “30% of all twenty-year-old homosexuals will be HIV positive or dead by the 
time they reach thirty.” Id. at 45.  
 165. See id. at 40 (quoting a Florida state legislator stating that “homosexuals lead unstable 
lives, as a rule”). 
 166. See Jodi L. Bell, Prohibiting Adoption by Same-Sex Couples: Is It in the “Best Interest of 
the Child?”, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 345, 351 (2001) (“A fear of AIDS and the mistaken presumption that 
homosexual parents will molest their children were the initial factors leading to the enactment of 
the New Hampshire prohibition statute.”); Hong, supra note 163, at 40 (“[S]tate legislators in New 
Hampshire enacted their statute by relying on the hate-driven stereotypes that all gay people have 
AIDS and gay parents will molest their children.”); see also George, supra note 157, at 129. Utah 
also cited the work of David Blankenhorn, who purported to establish that “married fatherhood 
[is] the primary inhibitor of male domestic violence,” because only through channeling natural 
male aggression and violence towards caring for a wife or child could those instincts be forestalled. 
Hong, supra note 163, at 51–52.  
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b. The Supreme Court and Alternative Fact Avoidance 
While there are examples of courts engaging more directly with 
these kinds of questionable facts, they have not always done so in an 
enlightened manner.167 For example, as William Eskridge has argued, 
when the Court in Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service 
applied a federal statute barring entry to noncitizens suffering from a 
“psychopathic personality . . . or a mental defect”168 to the case of a gay 
foreign national, a majority of justices “apparently accepted stereotypes 
about gay people that were widely believed by men of their age group—
not only the notion that homosexuals were afflicted with mental illness, 
but also that they were a threat to the social order. Even the dissenting 
justices treated the homosexual as a pitiable ‘freak,’ who is ‘the product 
of arrested development.’”169 In his Ratchford v. Gay Lib dissent, then-
Associate Justice Rehnquist analogized homosexuality to “measles,” 
emphasizing the danger of the affliction spreading in the “university 
setting where many students are still coping with sexual problems 
which accompany late adolescence and early adulthood.”170 In child 
custody cases, even after the scientific consensus had disavowed these 
tropes, courts continued to vindicate the old gay “recruitment” 
stereotype, as well as the more general “threat of children becoming 
homosexual as . . . the result of living in a gay-friendly environment 
with gay role models.”171 In more modern family-law cases, courts have 
given credence to the theory that heterosexuals may simply be more 
adept at raising children than similarly situated members of the LGBT 
community.172 
 
 167. This discussion highlights a potential ancillary benefit of broken records review: 
compelling judges into a threshold confrontation with their own perhaps false assumptions about 
unfamiliar groups. 
 168. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(a)(4), 66 Stat. 163, 182 (1952) 
(repealed 1990). 
 169. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 154, at 157–58 (quoting and characterizing Boutilier v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Service, 387 U.S. 118, 127 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).  
 170. See id. at 190–91, (quoting and characterizing Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, 1084 
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). 
 171. See Marie-Amélie George, The Custody Crucible: The Development of Scientific Authority 
About Gay and Lesbian Parents, 34 LAW & HIST. REV. 487, 501, 518 (2016) (remarking that other 
courts denying LGBT parents custody and visitation rights “did not cite the conservative scientific 
research” and that “[t]he primary source of authority remained morality and common sense; courts 
ignored the scientific studies, even though they supported conservative positions, indicating they 
were unnecessary to justify the decisions”). 
 172. See e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 822 (11th Cir. 
2004); Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), 
decision approved in part, quashed in part sub nom. Cox v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 
656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995); see also Elizabeth L. Maurer, Errors That Won’t Happen Twice: A 
Constitutional Glance at a Proposed Texas Statute That Will Ban Homosexuals from Foster Parent 
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As a general proposition, courts—and especially the Supreme 
Court—have been quite content to evaluate state actions directed at, or 
disproportionately affecting, LGBT Americans on terrain other than 
their “factual” heritage. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court anchored its 
analysis around whether the privacy right previously read into the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extended so far as to 
confer “a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”173 
Concluding that such a right would have to derive from American 
“history and tradition,” it declined to strike down Georgia’s antisodomy 
statute.174 Writing for the majority, Justice White confined his 
reasoning to a comparative analysis of the privacy rights previously 
recognized in the Court’s due process jurisprudence, as applied to same-
sex sexual activity in the home.175 In his concurrence, Chief Justice 
Burger tapped into several oft-cited moral and biblical rationales for 
proscribing homosexual conduct, including the “crime against nature,” 
“crime not fit to be named,” and “an offense of ‘deeper malignity’ than 
rape.”176 The sufficiency of these motivations was countered in Justice 
Stevens’s dissent,177 but only Justice Blackmun, in dissent, engaged 
directly with the “factual” bases for the act, noting that “the record 
before us is barren of any evidence to support petitioner’s claim” that 
criminalizing sodomy was in the interest of “the general public health 
and welfare.”178 
 
Eligibility, 5 APPALACHIAN J.L. 171, 189 (2006) (noting that the court in question made this 
assumption in the “absence of conclusive research by either party”). 
 173. 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 174. Id. at 194. 
 175. See generally id. at 190–92 (“We first register our disagreement with the Court of Appeals 
and with respondent that the Court’s prior cases have construed the Constitution to confer a right 
of privacy that extends to homosexual sodomy . . . .”). 
 176. Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*215). 
 177. Id. at 216–18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 178. Id. at 202–03, 208 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that the deficiencies in the 
record were in part attributable to the fact that the appeal came from the dismissal stage). Some 
such factual issues had been briefed. There had been an amicus brief in support of the state that 
went into fairly extraordinary and graphic detail about a litany of sexual practices and their 
respective effects on the transmission of the AIDS virus. Brief of David Robinson, Jr. as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (No. 85-140), 1985 WL 667941, at *7, *25–
26 (“[T]his is not a homophobic brief. It is a labor of love, an effort to help keep homosexuals, and 
the rest of us, alive.”). The state’s own brief had argued that that “Georgia could reasonably believe 
that homosexuality . . . leads to other ‘deviate practices such as sado-masochism, group orgies, or 
transvestism, to name only a few’; that homosexuality is usually practiced in public parks, with 
adolescents, and is accompanied by violence; and that homosexuality is pervasively linked to the 
transmission of AIDS.” ESKRIDGE, supra note 154, at 240; see also Brief of Petitioner Michael J. 
Bowers Attorney General of Georgia, Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (No. 85-140), 1985 WL 667939, at *36–
38. In addition to “rest[ing] on largely false stereotypes,” much of what Bowers’s attorneys argued 
was falsifiable (and indeed negated in the American Public Health Association’s amicus brief in 
support of Hardwick), particularly as applied to sex between women. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 
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Less than a month after Bowers, Missouri’s own same-sex 
sodomy laws were upheld in the state’s Supreme Court.179 The court in 
State v. Walsh spoke directly to the state’s “factual” public health 
rationales for the laws, including the “general promiscuity 
characteristic of the homosexual lifestyle” and holding that “[w]e need 
not refer to medical literature to suggest, for example, that there might 
rationally be health ramifications to anal intercourse and/or oral-
genital sex.”180 
In its eventual repeal of Bowers, the Court again declined to 
wade into factual waters. Writing for the Court in Lawrence v. Texas, 
and later in Obergefell v. Hodges, Justice Kennedy devoted his energies 
to his signature “dignity” rhapsodies.181 In Lawrence, he took aim at the 
moral underpinnings of antisodomy legislation, as well as their 
supposed traditional bearings, which had sustained the Georgia statute 
in Bowers—exalting Stevens’s dissent, and tiptoeing around 
Blackmun’s interactions with the factual record.182 This values-based 
 
154, at 240. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association and American 
Public Health Association in Support of Respondents, Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (No. 85-140), 1986 WL 
720445, at *21–22 (“As applied to homosexual behavior, the Georgia statute is also overly broad. 
Lesbians as a group are not at risk for AIDS.”). 
 179. See State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 512–13 (Mo. 1986) (“We believe further that 
punishing homosexual acts as a Class A misdemeanor . . . is rationally related to the State’s 
constitutionally permissible objective of implementing and promoting the public morality.”). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594, 2603 (2015); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 567, 575 (2003). The choice to circumnavigate factual waters was not for lack of input. The 
surrounding factual issues had been briefed much more extensively in Obergefell and Lawrence 
than had been in Bowers. Indeed, although as a Lawrence amicus brief submitted by a broad 
coalition of medical groups noted, “The State of Texas has never defended the constitutionality of 
the Homosexual Conduct Law . . . based on any public health interest,” that did not stop its amici 
from attempting to do so on its behalf. Brief of the American Public Health Association et al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164135, at 
*3. These amici harvested an eclectic selection of unsubstantiated, speculative, and 
unsophisticated scientific sources in support of the anti-LGBT actions. See e.g., Brief Amicus 
Curiae of Professor Daniel N. Robinson, Ph.D. in Support of Respondents at 31–32, Obergefell, 135 
S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1432638, at *31–32 (treating as 
interchangeable the increased incidences of AIDS caused by being part of a population where the 
disease happens to exist, and the increased incidences because AIDS is inherent to behavior 
engaged in by members of that population); Brief of Amici Curiae Center for Arizona Policy and 
Pro-Family Network in Support of Respondent, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 
367560, at *12 (offering the unattributed assertion that “[i]f, as noted by the Amici APA, anti-gay 
harassment and violence are underreported by homosexuals, it is just as likely that changes in 
sexual orientation are underreported because of the American Psychiatric Association’s 
unwillingness to validate their experiences”); Brief of the States of Alabama, South Carolina, and 
Utah as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 
470172, at *2 (taking care to refer to homosexual conduct as a “choice”); Brief of Amici Curiae 
Texas Legislators, Representative Warren Chisum, et al., in Support of Respondent, Lawrence, 
539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 367560, at *16 (seeking to protect the state of Texas from the 
“ravages of infection and disease” purportedly caused by same-sex sodomy). 
 182. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 560.  
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(rather than fact-derived) framing teed up Justice Scalia’s proclamation 
that Lawrence spelled “the end of all morals legislation.”183 
In Obergefell, Kennedy did spend a few paragraphs 
acknowledging the factual “deliberation . . . [,] referenda, legislative 
debates, and grassroots campaigns, as well as countless studies, papers, 
books, . . . popular and scholarly writings” and the general scientific 
consensus that had emerged in the final quarter of the twentieth 
century that “sexual orientation is both a normal expression of human 
sexuality and immutable.”184 He also weighed in on the factual 
underpinnings surrounding the role of marriage in childrearing, and 
the ability of same-sex couples to “provide loving and nurturing homes 
to their children.”185 Still, his conclusion relied much more heavily on 
the abstract intersection of liberty and equality interests than on any 
concrete factual or scientific premises.186 
c. Spurning Alternative Facts in Court  
On the other hand, there are instances of courts critically 
examining the factual underpinnings of anti-LGBT state action, 
thereby coming to the defense of a group that political processes have 
 
 183. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“If, as the Court asserts, the promotion of majoritarian 
sexual morality is not even a legitimate state interest, none of the above-mentioned laws can 
survive rational-basis review.”). In a similar respect, Kennedy’s rubric blunted a concurring 
Justice O’Connor’s blanket (and clearer) edict that “[m]oral disapproval of a group cannot be a 
legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 583 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). By and large, the other Lawrence and Obergefell opinions provided little more factual 
fodder than did Kennedy’s. In Lawrence, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence and Justice Scalia’s 
dissent faced off regarding the moral justifications for the statute, although Scalia’s recoil from 
the “homosexual agenda” echoed the “factual” fearmongering conspiracies heralded by anti-LGBT 
operatives past. Id. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Obergefell, Roberts focused his dissent on 
what he believed had been a judicial subversion of democratic processes, though he did briefly 
tread on factual ground when he compared the majority’s assertion that its decision would pose no 
harm to same-sex couples or third parties to the infamous Lochner court’s claim that “a law like 
the one before us involves neither the safety, the morals nor the welfare of the public, and that the 
interest of the public is not in the slightest degree affected by such an act.” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2611, 2622, 2624 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 
(1905)). For his part, Justice Alito acknowledged that there were factual issues at play, though he 
suggested that no scientific consensus could be found on any of them. Id. at 2642 (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (“At present, no one—including social scientists, philosophers, and historians—can 
predict with any certainty what the long-term ramifications of widespread acceptance of same-sex 
marriage will be.”). 
 184. 135 S. Ct. at 2596, 2605 (citing Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 7–17, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 
14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1004713, at *7–17).  
 185. Id. at 2600 (citing Brief for Gary J. Gates as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 
4, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1021451, at *4).  
 186. See id. (“[W]hile Lawrence confirmed a dimension of freedom that allows individuals to 
engage in intimate association without criminal liability, it does not follow that freedom stops 
there. Outlaw to outcast may be a step forward, but it does not achieve the full promise of liberty.”). 
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historically failed to protect against alternative facts. Consider, for 
example, the litigation challenging the constitutionality of state 
marriage bans. In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, an early 
state decision upholding the right to marry, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the state’s same-sex marriage ban 
had no rational relationship to state-proffered justifications, such as 
“providing a ‘favorable setting for procreation’ ” or “ensuring the 
optimal setting for child rearing.”187 As the court pointed out, the 
innumerable examples of childless opposite-sex marriages 
demonstrated that “fertility is not a condition of marriage”; neither 
could the state offer any evidence that same-sex couples are less capable 
of being “excellent” parents than opposite-sex couples.188 The policies, 
in essence, were built on generalizations that seemed unsustainable, 
and the sheer number of counterexamples indicated that the states’ 
rationales were, at bottom, meritless. More recently, in Kitchen v. 
Herbert, a Utah district court rejected the state’s argument that 
“proceeding with caution” was a legitimate state interest justifying a 
same-sex marriage ban.189 In doing so, it approvingly cited an amicus 
brief submitted by the District of Columbia and fourteen states 
asserting that recognizing same-sex unions “has not resulted in any 
decrease in opposite-sex marriage rates, any increase in divorce rates, 
or any increase in the number of nonmarital births.”190  
Additionally, some trial courts have engaged directly with the 
factual bases for anti-LGBT legislation. DeBoer v. Snyder, one of the 
matters later consolidated into Obergefell, was “replete” at trial with 
expert testimony and empirical evidence concerning “families headed 
by same-sex parents, academic achievement for children raised by 
same-sex couples, an ongoing study about relationship stability, and so 
on.”191 Similarly, the trial phase of Perry v. Schwarzenegger (later 
argued in the Supreme Court as Hollingsworth v. Perry) “was largely a 
battle of experts” with the court enthusiastically “engaged in a lengthy 
analysis of . . . empirical evidence” as well as “the methodological and 
substantive components of the underlying social science.”192 In 
 
 187. 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003). 
 188. Id. at 961, 963. 
 189. 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1213 (D. Utah 2013). 
 190. Id. 
 191. See Clare Huntington, The Empirical Turn in Family Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 227, 247–
48 (2018) (characterizing DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760 (E.D. Mich. 2014), rev’d, 772 
F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584). 
 192. Id. at 229, 246 (“A crucial part of the decision was the finding that children of same-sex 
parents have similar outcomes to children raised by different-sex couples, undermining 
California’s rationale for differentiating couples based on sexual orientation.”); see Perry v. 
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undertaking this analysis, the court was able to refute a number of anti-
LGBT stereotypes, including the suggestion that members of the LGBT 
community are twelve times more likely to molest children than 
heterosexuals.193 But that inclination to delve into the details, at least 
in LGBT rights litigation, has not typically trickled down the 
procedural stream. For his analytical undertakings in Perry, Chief 
Judge Walker of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California earned a direct rebuke from Justice Alito in a lengthy 
footnote from his dissent in United States v. Windsor.194 
3. Voter ID Laws and an Emerging Broken Records Rationale 
During the past decade, legislatures have leveraged misplaced 
alarm about voter fraud, imposing highly restrictive voter ID measures. 
These laws purport to bring integrity to elections,195 yet they rely on 
meritless claims196 of voter fraud.197 These provisions not only threaten 
 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 
1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013). 
 193. Huntington, supra note 191, at 269–70. 
 194. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 815 n.7 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he trial 
judge . . . purported to make ‘findings of fact’ . . . . At times, the trial reached the heights of 
parody.”). 
 195. See Larsen, supra note 4, at 210 (outlining the rapid increase of voter ID laws between 
2006 and 2018). 
 196. A number of studies have demonstrated the lack of factual foundation to many of these 
laws. Although the Heritage Foundation maintains a database of nearly 1,300 instances of voter 
fraud across the country dating back to the 1980s, see Election Fraud Cases from Across the United 
States, HERITAGE FOUND., https://www.heritage.org/voterfraud (last visited Mar. 5, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/WD9B-DVX3], multiple studies have shown that so-called voter fraud happens 
in far more limited circumstances than is often alleged. For example, a 2014 study found that since 
2000, in general, primary, special, and municipal elections, there were only thirty-one instances of 
actual voter fraud. Justin Levitt, A Comprehensive Investigation of Voter Impersonation Finds 31 
Credible Incidents Out of One Billion Votes Cast, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2014, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/08/06/a-comprehensive-investigation-of-
voter-impersonation-finds-31-credible-incidents-out-of-one-billion-ballots-cast/?utm_ 
term=.3151e37c7440 [https://perma.cc/4BYX-C6NU]. Indeed, research conducted by the Brennan 
Center suggests that mundane administrative errors and systemic shortcomings may be 
responsible for many of the circumstances commonly attributed to voter fraud. Justin Levitt, The 
Truth About Voter Fraud, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 7–11 (2007), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/The%20Truth%20About%20Voter%20
Fraud.pdf [https://perma.cc/23BQ-ER5E] [hereinafter Levitt, The Truth About Voter Fraud] 
(providing examples of circumstances often attributed to voting fraud, including clerical errors, 
errors and bad matching in the underlying data, innocent dual registration, complications due to 
death and criminal records, and voter mistakes). Seen in this light, President Trump’s claims of 
“millions” of illegal voters in the 2016 election continues to be without empirical support. Larsen, 
supra note 4, at 178. To put it bluntly, the claim about so-called voter fraud is largely grounded 
not in fact, but alternative fact. Furthermore, stricter identification laws, often proposed as a 
solution to voter fraud, would only address problems that occur at the polls on voting day (such as 
impersonation), which are very rare. Levitt, The Truth About Voter Fraud, supra, at 6.  
 197. See, e.g., Borgmann, supra note 10, at 53–55 (discussing how an Indiana voter 
identification law was based on unfounded claims of voter fraud). Indeed, recent events have 
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core channels of political participation, but they restrict the ability of 
historically excluded groups to access those channels,198 thereby 
undermining legislative legitimacy.199 Thus, they present an especially 
pernicious application of alternative facts.  
Because such laws tend to have disproportionate impacts on 
historically marginalized communities, the roadmap for most voter ID 
challenges involves the rather difficult hurdle of persuading courts that 
such disparate effects were the result of intentional efforts to 
discriminate.200 Yet, under current Supreme Court doctrine, the effect 
of these laws on minority populations lacks constitutional relevance in 
the absence of a finding of discriminatory intent,201 without which 
courts will not invoke more exacting scrutiny of facially neutral 
legislation or administrative action.202 
 
demonstrated that partisan racial discrimination may be the true underlying motive behind 
election policies that disenfranchise minorities while claiming a neutral purpose. For example, 
files on hard drives recovered from the estate of the late Thomas Hofeller, a top Republican Party 
strategist, reveal his role in prompting the Trump Administration to add a citizenship question to 
the 2020 census and revise legislative maps accordingly under the guise of protecting minority 
voting rights, though the plan was actually engineered to undercount traditionally Democratic 
Hispanic voters to the benefit of Republicans and non-Hispanic whites. Gary D. Robertson and 
Geoff Mulvihill, Gerrymandering Architect’s Files Figure in Census, Map Cases, AP NEWS (June 
28, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/d53cafafac6b42429a88bb012d34907b [https://perma.cc/5CKS-
SYYL]; Michael Wines, Deceased G.O.P. Strategist’s Hard Drives Reveal New Details on the Census 
Citizenship Question, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/us/census-
citizenship-question-hofeller.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share [https://perma.cc/U6VA-84JD].  
 198. Voter identification laws can depress turnout and limit the number of eligible voters, 
specifically people of color, low-income individuals, the elderly, and students. Voter Identification, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 12, 2006), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/policy-brief-
voter-identification [https://perma.cc/M6M2-PHDK]; see Wendy Underhill, Voter Identification 
Requirements: Voter ID Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 17, 2019), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx [https://perma.cc/V8LL-
NKN2] (presenting information on current voter registration laws in effect across the country). 
 199. In May 2017, the Trump Administration assembled a Presidential Advisory Commission 
on Election Integrity. See Disbanded: Trump’s “Voter Fraud” Commission, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUST. (July 30, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/issues/trump-fraud-commission 
[https://perma.cc/H2BE-K9BW]. President Trump created the Commission after repeatedly 
asserting the need to clamp down on instances of voter fraud. Id. President Trump disbanded the 
commission in early 2018 due to states’ reluctance to comply with requests to submit extensive 
voter registration data and lawsuits challenging the same. See generally Robert Timothy Reagan, 
The Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity, FED. JUD. CTR. (Sept. 12, 2019), 
https://www.fjc.gov/content/330831/emereleclitig [https://perma.cc/3WFD-F3BB] (case study 
examining the commission and its collapse).  
 200. Another route to receiving heightened scrutiny in such cases occurs by attacking the 
encumbrance on a fundamental right. See generally Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really 
Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143 (2008) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s 
inconsistent approach to voting rights). 
 201. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 70 (1980) (finding that the evidence in the present 
case fell far short of showing that the appellants “conceived or operated [a] purposeful devic[e] to 
further racial . . . discrimination” (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971))).  
 202. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–42 (1976) (upholding an entrance exam for police 
officers in the District of Columbia that African Americans tended to fail at higher rates than 
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Under a broken records approach, by contrast, reviewing courts 
are spared the difficulty of uncovering an intent to discriminate on the 
basis of a protected characteristic, something courts find to be quite 
difficult.203 Indeed, some courts have already shown an ability to think 
along these lines. In one such case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit accused the North Carolina legislature of manufacturing 
a phony narrative for its voter ID law by “impos[ing] cures for problems 
that [do] not exist.”204 In another case, the Fifth Circuit found that the 
Texas legislature had abused the legislative process by imposing 
restrictions on voters all for the sake of an “almost nonexistent 
problem.”205 And in a third case involving executive (rather than 
legislative) action, the District Court for the Western District of Texas 
determined that an attempted voter purge, which inaccurately targeted 
tens of thousands of registered voters who had indicated they were 
noncitizens when they first applied for driver’s licenses, appeared to be 
“a solution looking for a problem.”206  
The legislation invalidated by the Fourth Circuit in North 
Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory purported to serve 
several purposes, including preventing voter fraud, achieving 
consistency in early voting among various counties, avoiding 
administrative challenges in mail verification for same-day registrants, 
and simplifying the process of on-boarding new voters aging into the 
registration system.207 To accomplish these goals, the legislature 
implemented a photo ID requirement,208 decreased Sunday voting 
days,209 and eliminated same-day registration and preregistration.210 
 
whites and refusing to apply more exacting scrutiny in the absence of compelling evidence of 
racially based motivation); see also Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 280–81 (1979) (upholding 
legislation in Massachusetts giving preference for veterans in civil service positions despite the 
law’s discriminatory impact on female applicants); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270–71 (1977) (holding that a town’s refusal to rezone a tract of land to allow 
for development of multifamily dwellings was not motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose 
or intent, despite the disparate impact the zoning decision had on the African-American 
population). 
 203. See Siegel, supra note 119, at 1135–36 (addressing the “extraordinarily difficult to prove” 
terms in which the Court has defined discriminatory purpose); see also Ian Haney-López, 
Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1785 (2012) (“The overwhelming consensus among 
constitutional scholars is that Davis is the source of today’s failed doctrine, insofar as it required 
direct proof regarding the minds of government actors.”). 
 204. See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 205. Veasey v. Perry, 830 F.3d 216, 239 (5th Cir. 2016).  
 206. Tex. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Whitley, No. 5:19-CV-00074-FB, at 2 (W.D. 
Tex. Feb. 27, 2019) (order on preliminary matters). 
 207. 831 F.3d at 235–38. 
 208. Id. at 235. 
 209. Id. at 226. 
 210. Id. at 237–38. 
        
2020] BROKEN RECORDS REVIEW 469 
Each restriction disproportionately affected African Americans at a 
time when that population, which overwhelmingly supported 
Democratic candidates, had, owing to the very voting mechanisms this 
law abolished, achieved increased access to and participation in the 
state’s elections.211  
The Fourth Circuit analyzed its findings through the standard 
doctrinal category of improper intent. Once the court was able to 
surmise “that, at least in part, race motivated the North Carolina 
legislature,”212 the court closely examined the fit between the 
legislature’s stated goals and the means it had chosen to carry them 
out.213 Owing to the legislature’s curious interest in and use of data 
about race in crafting the law,214 and because that data undermined the 
law’s proffered justifications, the court was able to find that the 
legislature had intentionally discriminated on the basis of race.215  
In many ways, the court’s analysis is congenial with a broken 
records approach. As the court observed, the 
“record . . . undermine[d] . . . [the] concerns of voter fraud” that were 
asserted to prop up the legislation.216 In the face of the legislature’s 
claimed need to address a serious problem, it had chosen not to address 
voting processes that needed to be reformed, instead focusing on those 
that did not. Indeed, the court pointed out, the government’s own 
experts contradicted the legislature’s assertions and its chosen means 
to meet its stated goals.217 In short, the legislature had “contrived a 
problem in order to impose a solution.”218  
While discriminatory intent doctrine may have arguably been 
the most readily available tool to address this law’s constitutional 
infirmities, a broken records approach might have provided a more 
straightforward analysis. Broken records review would bypass the 
motive element entirely, relieving courts of the burden of divining 
intent when the asserted factual predicates of a given law are shown to 
be utterly lacking in evidentiary support. Moreover, a broken records 
approach would likely better address the widespread phenomenon in 
which marginalized groups, owing to their lack of representation in the 
 
 211. Id. at 226. 
 212. Id. at 235. 
 213. Id. at 235–38. 
 214. See id. at 216–18 (describing the racial data requested by legislators). 
 215. Id. at 219, 226–27. 
 216. Id. at 236. The strict ID requirements lacked any factual connection to the objective of 
preventing voter fraud. Id. at 235. On the contrary, the legislature had specific evidence of fraud 
among absentee voters—and a request from the state elections board to take remedial action—but 
chose to allow mail-in absentee voting without photo ID. Id. at 235–36. 
 217. Id. at 225, 232. 
 218. Id. at 238. 
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legislative chamber, are easily targeted by lawmakers who can conceal 
their motivation by dressing up laws in neutral language while offering 
factually defective rationales for the legislation. 
B. Broken Records Review and Substantive Due Process 
Putting aside equal protection, a broken records approach is also 
prevalent within substantive due process. In the context of abortion 
legislation, in which courts inquire whether proposed restrictions place 
an “undue burden” on the right to an abortion,219 concerns about 
alternative facts frequently manifest when legislative requirements are 
enacted in the name of protecting maternal health. While such laws 
proclaim the altruistic goal of protecting women from increased risks of 
breast cancer, depression, suicide, infertility, infections, and medical 
complications, courts have invalidated laws based on claims about 
maternal health that either lack support from or have been discredited 
by mainstream scientific and medical communities.220  
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
the Supreme Court emphasized that the state must prove a medical 
requirement is “reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal 
health” in order to justify placing a burden on abortion access.221 While 
numerous states have restricted abortion access in the name of 
protecting women’s health since Casey, this tactic reaches back even 
further than 1992. Indeed, state legislatures have been advancing 
abortion restrictions as a form of maternal health protection for more 
 
 219. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (joint opinion). 
 220. See Larsen, supra note 4, at 177, 203–05 (discussing controversial informed consent laws 
that require abortion providers to tell women seeking an abortion that doing so increases the risk 
of breast cancer, despite statements by the National Cancer Institute to the contrary). Because 
there is a medical consensus that abortion is extremely safe, with less than 0.3 percent of patients 
in the United States experiencing a complication from the procedure that requires hospitalization, 
laws purporting to restrict abortions on health-related grounds are harder to support empirically. 
See id. at 207 (proffering statistical evidence about abortion complications); see also Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 684 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (stating that the evidence 
demonstrated that abortion has low rates of serious complications and is much safer than many 
common medical procedures not subject to such intense regulation and scrutiny), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015), 
modified, 790 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 
S. Ct. 2292 (2016); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d 972, 983 
(D.S.D. 2009) (citing professional associations that refute any connection between abortion and 
mental health problems), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 
653 F.3d 662 (8th Cir. 2011), vacated in part on reh’g en banc sub nom. Planned Parenthood Minn., 
N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 662 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2011), and rev’d on reh’g en banc in part, 686 F.3d 
889 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 221. 505 U.S. at 900–01; see also Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 963 F. Supp. 
2d 858, 860 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (quoting Casey’s specifications and concluding that “there is a 
troubling lack of justification for the hospital admitting privileges requirement”).  
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than forty years. In Doe v. Bolton, a case decided the same day as Roe 
v. Wade, the State of Georgia attempted to implement regulatory 
provisions requiring that abortions be conducted in accredited hospitals 
and that a total of three physicians plus a hospital staff abortion 
committee approve the procedure.222 Reviewing data presented by the 
challengers, and the lack thereof by the state, the Court found that none 
of these three requirements bore a sufficient connection to the health of 
the patient to justify the burden imposed on abortion access.223 Relying 
on the Court’s ruling in Doe, an Alabama district court held that a state 
must show “more than general statements of concern and claims that 
the regulations conceivably might, in some cases, lead to better health 
outcomes.”224 The State’s requirements in Planned Parenthood 
Southeast, Inc. v. Strange purportedly protected women’s health by 
ensuring high-quality credentialed doctors and proper care for medical 
complications, but upon examining the evidence presented, the court 
concluded that the legislature’s factual findings were “simply 
‘incorrect’ ”225 and that the State’s justifications for the requirements 
were “exceedingly weak” and “speculative.”226  
Courts have seized the opportunity in recent abortion cases to 
evaluate whether there is evidentiary support for a legitimate 
legislative purpose, finding in many cases that abortion restrictions are 
masquerading as health-protective policies without any benefit.227 
 
 222. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 193–201 (1973) (describing the law’s restrictions). 
 223. See id. at 195, 199–201; see also Reprod. Health Servs. v. Webster, 662 F. Supp. 407, 420 
(W.D. Mo. 1987) (finding that the State failed to prove that its hospitalization requirement for 
post-sixteen-week abortions was reasonably related to the State’s interest in maternal health), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Reprod. Health Serv. v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988), 
rev’d sub nom. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 224. Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1340–41 (M.D. Ala. 2014), 
as corrected (Oct. 24, 2014), supplemented, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1381 (M.D. Ala. 2014), and amended by, 
No. 2:13CV405-MHT, 2014 WL 5426891 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 24, 2014). 
 225. Id. at 1377 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165 (2007)). 
 226. Id. at 1378. 
 227. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 963 F. Supp. 2d 858, 860 (W.D. 
Wis. 2013) (holding that the record strongly supported a finding that no medical purpose was 
served by the state’s admitting privileges requirement); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. 
Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d 972, 983 (D.S.D. 2009) (finding that the state produced no evidence to 
support a claim that abortion causes an increased risk of suicide and related mental health 
problems), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662 
(8th Cir. 2011), vacated in part on reh’g en banc sub nom. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. 
v. Rounds, 662 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2011), and rev’d on reh’g en banc in part,  686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 
2012); Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1016 (D. Neb. 2004) (holding that Congress was 
wrong to conclude that the banned procedure seriously threatened women’s health and that no 
credible medical evidence supports the safety of partial-birth abortions), aff’d sub nom. Carhart v. 
Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of 
Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (concluding that “Congress’ ‘finding’ 
that the intact D & E procedure is never medically necessary is unreasonable and is not supported 
by substantial evidence as was available to Congress at the time”), aff’d sub nom. Planned 
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Perhaps the most noteworthy Supreme Court decision on this issue 
is Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, in which the Court affirmed the 
district court’s findings that the State’s surgical center and admitting 
privileges requirements provided few, if any, health benefits for women 
and thus did not justify the burden imposed on abortion access.228 The 
legislature’s stated purpose in enacting these provisions was to improve 
the standard of care for abortion patients,229 but the district court found 
that the concerns the law sought to address were “largely unfounded” 
and “without a reliable basis” in evidence.230 Rather than protecting 
patient health, the law would have the perverse effect of increasing 
health risks associated with delays in seeking early abortion care, 
would require longer-distance travel to obtain an abortion, and would 
potentially bring about more self-induced abortions.231 Furthermore, 
the court “found no significant health-related problem for the new law 
to cure,”232 as the record indicated that before the act’s passage, 
“abortion in Texas was extremely safe with particularly low rates of 
serious complications and virtually no deaths occurring on account of 
the procedure.”233  
As these abortion cases demonstrate, courts are willing and able 
to engage in the type of evidentiary analysis that broken records review 
champions. The inquiry steers the court’s review away from the 
subjective inquiry of whether a barrier to abortion is an undue burden 
in the eyes of individual jurists. Indeed, an objective, broken records 
examination of the evidence underlying contrived medical claims 
ensures that abortion legislation is not rooted in discredited myths 
about women’s health, something the undue burden standard might 
otherwise allow.234  
 
Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d sub nom. Gonzales 
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).  
 228. 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2298, 2318 (2016). 
 229. Brief for Appellants at 35–36, Whole Women’s Health v. Lakey, No. 14-50928, 2014 WL 
5802849 (5th Cir. Nov. 3, 2014), at *35–36.  
 230. Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 684 (W.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015), 
modified, 790 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292. 
 231. Id.  
 232. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2298 (summarizing the district court decision). 
 233. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 684–85. 
 234. See, e.g., Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2323–25 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (expressing 
astonishment that the majority found an undue burden existed, and maintaining that where a 
state provides medical justification for an abortion restriction that is “debatable,” the law does not 
impose an undue burden on abortion access).  
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V. BROKEN RECORDS’ NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
Given the current patchwork of factual review within 
constitutional jurisprudence, a clearer and more direct route is needed 
to tackle legislative trafficking in false claims, especially where 
politically marginalized groups are concerned. The lack of such a 
mechanism has contributed to injustice where available constitutional 
tools have left courts powerless and have produced unclear and 
nontransparent doctrines in cases where factual analysis was imposed 
through the back door of other frameworks.235 By contrast, a fact-based 
threshold inquiry could, at least in some cases and contexts, tailor the 
conventional two-tiered model of equal protection to the problem of 
underrepresented groups’ victimization by alternative facts. If, as 
Gerald Gunther argued in 1972, equal protection is going to have “bite 
without ‘strict scrutiny,’ ”236 a broken records inquiry can provide the 
teeth, denying broad rational basis deference where legislatures traffic 
in alternative facts. The mechanism provides both a useful descriptive 
framework for understanding certain heightened-scrutiny and so-called 
animus cases as well as a normative framework for thinking about the 
dialectic of constitutionalism and civil rights.  
A. Fortifying Equal Protection Doctrine Through a Broken Records 
Approach 
In the heightened-scrutiny and animus contexts, broken records 
review allows courts to conduct openly and more effectively the factual 
analyses they currently conduct implicitly—but in a standalone, 
threshold inquiry that leaves existing doctrinal frameworks intact and 
spares courts the task of psychoanalyzing legislative purpose.237 
Similarly, broken records review does not meaningfully elevate rational 
basis’s standard of review, nor detract from its deferential character. 
This is because the burden lies with the claimant to show, first, that 
dubious factual predicates underlie a given piece of legislation and that 
a baseline of evidence does not exist to support those predicates. If the 
claimant cannot do so, the court continues to be bound by the doctrine’s 
 
 235. See supra Section I.B (describing the dearth of doctrinal tools to address laws grounded 
in alternative facts). 
 236. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model 
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1972). 
 237. Of course, broken records review supplements, rather than supplants, existing doctrine. 
Thus, to the extent a given law or policy is the result of an improper legislative motive, courts are 
naturally still equipped to apply existing doctrines to address those situations.  
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deference to the government’s ends and its chosen means.238 However, 
by requiring the government to earn deference where a challenger can 
discharge that duty, broken records review indirectly restores the 
rights-protective potential of rational basis review. 
In her work on equal protection, Katie Eyer has noted ways in 
which the constitutional canon has sidelined rational basis review as 
an important locus of constitutional protection for underrepresented 
groups. As she explains,  
[R]ational basis review has—in modern history—constituted one of the principal entry 
points for social movements seeking to effectuate constitutional change. It has been vital 
to the ability of social movements to create space for the disruption of the status quo—
arguably as vital as the heightened scrutiny doctrines conceptualized as central in 
canonical constitutional law accounts. Moreover, far from the static, easily categorized 
doctrine that the canon portrays, rational basis review has in fact been a messy, 
inconsistent affair, in which courts—especially the lower and state courts that decide most 
constitutional law cases—have never consistently applied one single doctrinal 
formulation.239 
Broken records review, by ferreting out factual distortions that give rise 
to law, arguably serves a similar objective, granting embryonic social 
movements and other political out-groups the rudiments of an 
otherwise unattainable objective hearing after legislatures have 
harmed them through alternative-fact-based lawmaking.  
The fact that courts perform factual analysis as part of various 
constitutional review frameworks, from abortion’s undue burden test, 
which explicitly calls for it,240 to heightened scrutiny under equal 
protection, which effectively invites it,241 means that its more formal 
inclusion would not upend courts’ settled expectations around the 
relationship between factual accuracy and constitutional meaning. On 
the contrary, mainstreaming broken records review would bring 
harmony to a disjointed set of legal doctrines and provide a 
representation-reinforcing judicial check on the peddling of legislative 
falsehoods.  
 
 238. See supra Section IV.A (situating broken records review within the context of equal 
protection methodology).  
 239. Katie R. Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1317, 1319–
20 (2018) (footnotes omitted). 
 240. See supra Section IV.B (emphasizing the problem of alternative facts in the context of 
abortion regulations purporting to safeguard maternal health).  
 241. See supra Section I.B (describing heightened scrutiny’s occasional reliance on factual 
analysis).  
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B. Broken Records Review, the Rational Basis Canon,  
and Lochnerism 
Broken records review fits neatly within the deeply rooted 
rational basis canon established by legendary decisions such as United 
States v. Carolene Products Co.242 In fact, broken records review is 
merely an application of principles that those cases articulated. 
Carolene Products, not to mention Lochner v. New York,243 primarily 
concerned the question of whether the Supreme Court was willing to sit 
as an unelected superlegislature when reviewing legislative policy 
choices addressing public problems. While broken records review 
cannot, as a rule, examine the wisdom of a legislature’s chosen policy 
on its own, it absolutely can dissect the legislature’s stated factual 
justifications for why it considers a policy to be wise—a capability of 
particular value to groups that were poorly positioned to resist the 
policy’s enactment in law. A discussion of canonical rational basis cases 
reveals that Lochner’s “bad constitutional odor”244 does not taint broken 
records review. 
Carolene Products, “the foundation for modern rational basis 
review,”245 powerfully supports the idea of—and the need for—broken 
records review as advanced by this Article. In its decision, the Court 
wrote that “the constitutionality of a statute predicated on the existence 
of a particular state of facts may be challenged by showing to the court 
that those facts have ceased to exist”—or never existed in the first 
place246—something the challengers did not claim to be the case in 
Carolene Products. The Filled Milk Act banned products in which 
vegetable fats had been added to milk to replace the animal fat,247 and 
the Defendants were being criminally prosecuted for the interstate 
transport of filled milk products.248 They argued that the statute was 
unconstitutional because of its underinclusivity—that the “prohibition 
has not been extended to oleomargarine or other butter substitutes in 
 
 242. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 243. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905), overruled in part by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 
v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952), and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), abrogated by W. 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 244. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: AN UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR 
LIMITED GOVERNMENT 371 (2014). 
 245. Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of Rational Basis Review, 102 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1633 
(2016). 
 246. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153. 
 247. See id. at 145–46. 
 248. Id. at 146. 
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which vegetable fats or oils are substituted for butter fat.”249 In 
dismissing this challenge, the Court surveyed the ample factual support 
for the statute in the legislative record,250 noting that Congress 
undertook “[a]n extensive investigation” before concluding “that the use 
of filled milk as a substitute for pure milk is generally injurious to 
health and facilitates fraud on the public.”251 There is no evidence that 
the defendant challenged the record, although “[i]t is hard to know if 
the Court believed the health claims or just ignored that the law more 
than likely represented the dairy industry’s desire to eliminate 
competition.”252 
But acknowledging the dairy industry’s likely motivation in 
advocating for the Filled Milk Act’s passage253 only demonstrates the 
value of a broken records approach to judicial review. As the Court 
acknowledged:  
[N]o pronouncement of a Legislature can forestall attack upon the constitutionality of the 
prohibition which it enacts by applying opprobrious epithets to the prohibited act, 
and . . . a statute would deny due process which precluded the disproof in judicial 
proceedings of all facts which would show or tend to show that a statute depriving the 
suitor of life, liberty, or property had a rational basis.254  
It is unclear whether (and perhaps unlikely that) the Carolene Products 
challengers would fall within the kinds of categories of marginalized 
groups that broken records review is best equipped to protect.  
Nevertheless, had the litigants framed their arguments to undermine 
the law based on the legislative record instead of its underinclusiveness, 
perhaps the Court would have more squarely addressed whether a 
manufactured, bogus public health rationale had been advanced to 
protect a particular industry. Of course, any value judgments 
pertaining to the ills of industry capture, or the underlying wisdom of 
the resulting policy, would have fallen outside the purview of broken 
records review—as would value judgments regarding legal 
discrimination against LGBT people, immigrants, and other vulnerable 
groups. But to the extent that the legislature deployed false or 
misleading science in an attempt to masquerade the effects of that 
 
 249. Id. at 151. The Court rejected that argument, finding that “[a] Legislature may hit at an 
abuse which it has found, even though it has failed to strike at another.” Id.  
 250. Id. at 148–50 nn.2 & 3.  
 251. Id. at 147–48. 
 252. James M. McGoldrick, Jr., The Rational Basis Test and Why It Is So Irrational: An Eighty-
Year Retrospective, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 751, 769 (2018). 
 253. Neil K. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for 
Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 416 (1984) (“It is not too uncharitable, perhaps, to 
suggest that concern for the dairies’ pocketbooks rather than for the consumer’s health best 
explains the dairy lobby’s efforts.”).  
 254. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152.  
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capture under the more politically palatable guise of public health, 
broken records review could have perhaps provided refuge for the act’s 
challengers. To be sure, such protection would be all the more valuable 
where the civil rights of maligned political out-groups, as opposed to the 
legality of a given business practice, are at stake. 
While some might fear that broken records review heralds a 
reversion to Lochnerism, the theory leads to no such outcome. The 
Lochner Court purported to review the end goal of the legislation 
without engaging in a serious confrontation with the factual 
justification for the challenged law. Instead, the Court made a values-
based assertion that “[t]o the common understanding the trade of a 
baker has never been regarded as an unhealthy one.”255 And to the 
extent that Lochner undermined a legislative value judgment through 
a judicial reconstruction of the arguments that the legislature might or 
might not have considered, a similar law would be unaltered by a 
broken records approach, which would not be triggered unless the 
legislature had promoted dubious justifications to advance its policy 
agenda.   
Broken records review does not generally interfere with a 
legislature’s ability to advantage, or disadvantage, groups according to 
its own whims. It merely provides a safeguard when those legislatures 
ground, articulate, or justify these choices using demonstrably faulty 
fact. Of course, in reality, bakers, producers of filled milk, and (for that 
matter) optometrists256 do not appear to be anywhere near as likely to 
be victimized by legislative use of alternative fact as the traditionally 
marginalized populations documented throughout this Article. But 
even when those underrepresented groups are targeted via purely 
values-driven legislation, they would need to look to other sources of 
constitutional relief, with little refuge in broken records review—at 
least not until the legislature begins making falsifiable factual claims 
in support of the law. 
Still, to further allay fears of judicial intrusion into legislative 
prerogatives, courts might consider adopting a “lookback period” 
beyond which even factually baseless laws must be allowed to stand 
unless and until the legislature decides to repeal them.257 While the 
exact time period (which could be twenty years or more) is a matter for 
future consideration, such a constraint would limit broken records 
 
 255. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 59 (1905), overruled in part by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 
v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952), and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), abrogated by W. 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 256. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486 (1955).  
 257. See generally Benjamin, supra note 140 (discussing the effect of outdated factual findings 
on judicial precedent). 
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review’s disruption of societal expectations and would be justified by 
the assumptions that a law that has stood the test of time without 
repeal likely has some factual basis, that legislative findings of fact 
would become harder to defend as memories fade and participants 
retire (or pass on), and that a genuinely victimized group would mount 
a challenge in the courts within such a timeframe.  
CONCLUSION 
No matter how serious and important the underlying legislative 
purpose, laws grounded in alternative facts raise real problems of 
constitutional import for groups excluded from political processes. 
Currently, however, judicial review often takes on an awkward posture 
when it comes to alternative facts. This difficulty derives from the 
structure of constitutional deference norms—including the 
fundamental idea that, absent an improper motivation, if not animus, 
a law need only be grounded in a mere rational basis. It may also be a 
result of the Court’s wariness to enter the political thicket.  
The current predisposition to ignore the factual premises 
underlying legislation, and to favor exclusively intent-driven inquiries 
such as animus, can create a troubling blind spot. While legislative 
animus surely explains some of the motivation behind laws that target 
marginalized groups, other laws based in factual inaccuracies are not 
always amenable to intent-based frameworks. Thus, even if the Court’s 
chosen animus label is not always inapt, it overshadows other 
important aspects of laws that (explicitly or not) target groups for 
second-class status.  
By comparison, a broken records inquiry may ultimately better 
exemplify how laws grounded in factual distortion may be vulnerable to 
constitutional challenge. And because the federal judiciary appears 
generally unwilling to substantively expand the equal protection 
doctrine’s scope, broken records review provides a procedural 
mechanism for securing substantive protections that a broader coalition 
of judges might find appealing, not to mention a more realistic 
framework through which groups unable to protect their interests in 
the legislature may vindicate substantive rights in the future.  
 
 
